Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2020

Avoidance Creep
Charlotte Garden

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty
Part of the Construction Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Labor and Employment Law
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Charlotte Garden, Avoidance Creep, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 331 (2020).
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/828

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Seattle University School of
Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

ARTICLE

AVOIDANCE CREEP

CHARLOTTE GARDEN†
At first glance, constitutional avoidance—the principle that courts construe
statutes to avoid conflict with the Constitution when possible—appears both
unremarkable and benign. But when courts engage in constitutional avoidance, they
frequently construe statutory language in a manner contrary to both its plain meaning
and to the underlying congressional intent. Then, successive decisions often magnify
the problems of avoidance—a phenomenon I call “avoidance creep.” When a court
distorts a statute in service of constitutional avoidance, a later court may amplify the
distortion, incrementally changing both statutory and constitutional doctrine in ways
that are unsupported by any rationale for constitutional avoidance.
This Article identifies the phenomenon of avoidance creep and demonstrates its
wide-ranging eﬀects by explaining how it has warped the development of labor law
in two areas. First, courts have limited unions’ abilities to engage in “secondary”
strikes and picketing. Second, the Supreme Court has reduced or eliminated unions’
abilities to assess dues or other fees from represented workers, culminating in the
Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME. Collectively, these avoidance-driven shifts
in labor law amount to a profound change in its overall character. Yet these decisions
often do not result from freestanding analysis of the relevant statutes. Rather, many
of these decisions flow directly from prior cases invoking constitutional avoidance as
a means of reaching a decision that is dubious as a matter of statutory interpretation,
constitutional analysis, or both. After documenting these problems, the Article
† Co-Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development and Associate Professor of Law,
Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from James J.
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proposes measures to promote honest examination of the role constitutional avoidance
plays in doctrinal development and to mitigate its harmful consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to answer two questions that appear at ﬁrst glance to
be unrelated. First, what happens over time when a line of cases is grounded
on the canon of constitutional avoidance? Second, what explains the
anomalous development of the law governing labor unions’ First Amendment
rights? These questions have the same answer: a phenomenon that I call
“avoidance creep.”
Constitutional avoidance occurs when a court adopts one reading of a
statute over another in order to avoid answering a constitutional question.1
1 “Constitutional avoidance” refers to several diﬀerent interpretive moves. See Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing diﬀerent
constitutional avoidance methods). For example, a court might decide a case by resolving a nonconstitutional question, avoiding the need to decide an alternative argument raising a constitutional
question. But this Article focuses on the version of avoidance in which courts construe statutes to
avoid having to resolve constitutional doubts. Id. at 348; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW 247 (2012) (discussing the constitutional-doubt canon as interpreting
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Decisions based on constitutional avoidance are statutory decisions that,
according to the traditional account of avoidance, are supposed to reﬂect
values of judicial minimalism and respect for the elected branches of
government.2 But scholars have rightfully criticized the traditional account
and continue to debate questions such as whether or not avoidance has other
beneﬁts for courts or the development of law, and the extent to which courts
manipulate the doctrine to achieve their preferred results.3
This Article uses labor law as a case study to explore how courts and
agencies treat precedent that relies on constitutional avoidance. It ﬁnds that
avoidance decisions have tended to creep beyond their stated boundaries, as
decisionmakers either treat them as if they were constitutional precedent, or
extend them into new statutory contexts while disregarding key aspects of
their original reasoning.
Avoidance creep in labor law has had dramatic consequences for unions,
workers, and the law. The Supreme Court’s answers to some of the most
important and contentious questions in labor law rest on constitutional
avoidance. For example, constitutional avoidance was instrumental in
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, in which the Supreme Court held
that labor law permits unions and employers to mandate that railway
employees contribute towards union representation costs, but not other union
activities, such as campaigning on behalf of candidates for political oﬃce.4
Street went on to play a foundational role in a line of cases culminating with
the recent blockbuster case Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and

statutes in ways that “avoid[] placing its constitutionality in doubt”); Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (distinguishing “modern avoidance,” in which “the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such [serious constitutional] problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress,” from “classical avoidance,” in which the
Court uses the potential constitutional problem as a tiebreaker to choose among competing
reasonable interpretations of a statute (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988))).
2 See Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1275, 1288-89 (2016) (discussing one view of the constitutional avoidance canon as a method of
judicial restraint, allowing the courts to save a statute by sending it back to Congress to reconsider
statutory meaning in light of constitutional questions); see also generally ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
3 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
397, 401 (2005) (arguing that constitutional avoidance has sometimes facilitated courts’ preservation
of constitutional rights in situations where a constitutional holding might impair the Court’s public
legitimacy); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000) (arguing that constitutional avoidance helps to
preserve underenforced constitutional norms).
4 367 U.S. 740, 771 (1961); see also infra Section II.A.
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Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”),5 which held that public-sector
workers cannot be required to pay agency fees. Street was also key to
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, which limited mandatory union
fees in the private sector to those required to fund a union’s representational
activities.6 One cannot know what would have happened absent Street’s use of
avoidance and later avoidance creep—but this Article shows that avoidance
creep played a major doctrinal role in getting to Janus.
Avoidance also grounds a line of cases in which the Supreme Court has
narrowed the scope of the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) prohibition
on so-called “secondary”7 strikes and protests.8 That might sound like good
news for unions—and in some ways, it is. But in another instance of avoidance
creep, subsequent courts have wrongly assumed that when the Court narrowed
the NLRA in some contexts, it also reaffirmed that Congress could prohibit
other forms of union protest.9 The result is a body of law governing union
protest that is irreconcilable with modern First Amendment principles.10
The Article concludes that, overall, constitutional avoidance has
negatively aﬀected unions and the development of labor law. Avoidance creep
has led the Court to articulate new legal principles, including that compelling
a public employee to pay union dues implicates the First Amendment.
Additionally, courts sometimes over-read earlier avoidance decisions as
aﬃrmations of the basic constitutionality of the underlying law. Finally,
avoidance decisions make it more diﬃcult for the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to eﬀectively use its discretion to interpret key statutory
terms, leading to a stilted understanding of key concepts, including when
listeners are “coerced” by union protests.

5 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits requiring public
sector workers to pay dues to the union that represents them).
6 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988) (extending Street’s holding to the private sector).
7 A strike or boycott is “secondary” when it is aimed at an entity that does business with the employer
with whom a union has a labor dispute. See Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1962) (describing the nature and purpose of secondary boycotts).
8 See infra Section II.B; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-77 (1988) (holding that consumer-facing union handbilling was
not prohibited by the NLRA to avoid raising “serious constitutional concerns”); NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964) (holding that picketing in
support of a consumer boycott of a single product sold by a grocery store was not prohibited by the
NLRA as it did not threaten, coerce, or restrain the secondary employer).
9 See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (holding
that Congress may prohibit secondary picketing in some instances without violating the First
Amendment because “[s]uch picketing spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral party to join the
fray”); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that coercive conduct that has a secondary objective aimed at a neutral party is prohibited
by the NLRA and this prohibition does not violate the First Amendment).
10 See infra Section III.B.
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Part I of this Article begins by discussing the justiﬁcations for
constitutional avoidance that have been oﬀered by courts and commentators.
Academic supporters and critics of constitutional avoidance largely agree that
the traditional account—that avoidance is consistent with judicial modesty
because Congress would prefer to have a statute narrowed than to have it
struck down—is unrealistic. In place of that account, some scholars have
oﬀered alternative justiﬁcations for constitutional avoidance to backstop the
traditional judicial account, often focusing on the role that avoidance plays in
protecting constitutional norms and principles.
Part II draws on examples of constitutional avoidance in labor law to show
that—contrary to courts’ narratives about avoidance—its implementation in two
key areas of labor law has aggrandized courts’ authority, and also warped the
development of constitutional and statutory labor law through “avoidance creep.”
Finally, Part III discusses some larger consequences of constitutional
avoidance (and avoidance creep) in labor law. It traces the eﬀects of avoidance
creep on labor law and constitutional law. Then, it argues that neither the
traditional nor the alternative accounts of avoidance work in the labor law
context, in part because labor law is designed to balance competing
constitutional and quasi-constitutional rights and obligations. The article
ultimately concludes that—at least as it has been deployed in labor law—the
risk of avoidance creep is a signiﬁcant and previously unacknowledged
problem associated with constitutional avoidance.
I. ACCOUNTS OF AVOIDANCE
This section brieﬂy reviews courts’ and scholars’ accounts of
constitutional avoidance. The Court has traditionally characterized its
approach to avoidance as driven by judicial modesty and deference to
congressional preferences. But many judges and legal scholars rightly ﬁnd
this characterization disingenuous. Still, some critics of the traditional
account support for other reasons courts’ use of the avoidance canon in at
least some cases; they have oﬀered alternative justiﬁcations, which range from
structural constitutional principles such as federalism and separation of
powers, to pragmatic considerations regarding the potential political
consequences of constitutional decisions for courts. This discussion lays the
groundwork for the next section of the Article, which uses examples from
labor law to illustrate the underappreciated problem of avoidance creep.
In the Supreme Court’s own telling, there are two related beneﬁts of
constitutional avoidance. The ﬁrst is judicial minimalism: the Court reasons
that Congress would rather have a statute construed narrowly and upheld
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than construed broadly but struck down.11 The second emphasizes likely
congressional intent, presuming that Congress does not lightly approach the
constitutional boundaries of its authority.12
Judges and scholars have convincingly argued that these justiﬁcations for
avoidance are unavailing.13 The Court oﬀers no evidence to support its
account of congressional preferences, and logic often suggests Congress could
have precisely the opposite set of preferences. Why, for example, would
Congress prefer that a court construe a statute narrowly in order to avoid
answering a question that might or might not result in a determination of
unconstitutionality?14 Or, as Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner put it, “[t]he
11 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” (quoting United States
ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909))); Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (discussing how the constitutional avoidance canon is
followed out of respect for Congress, which supposedly legislates according to constitutional
limitations); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 457 (1989) (describing “Congress’ likely preference for validation rather than invalidation”).
12 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979) (reasoning that because
there was “no clear expression of . . . aﬃrmative intention” that the NLRB should have jurisdiction
over parochial schools, the NLRA should be construed not to cover those schools). Many judges and
scholars have traced this reasoning in Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal &
Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 2109, 2110 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court has resolved consequential cases by
construing statues to avoid constitutional diﬃculties and justifying the avoidance canon as a form
of judicial restraint); see also William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 837 (2001) (“The Court presumes that the legislature acts in
accordance with the Constitution, and the Court has no power even to consider the possibility that
the legislature has not, unless a case or controversy forces it to.”).
13 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (“The practical eﬀect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising
constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional
prohibition . . . .”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (1995) “([I]t
is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional
question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a
less strained interpretation of the same statute.”).
14 See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210 (1967) (“[I]t does not seem in any way
obvious, as a matter of interpretation, that the legislature would prefer a narrow construction which
does not raise constitutional doubts to a broader one which does raise them.”); see also Kelley, supra
note 12, at 846-47 (discussing how the “canon assumes that Congress never intends to depart from
constitutional comfort zones unless it is absolutely clear about it” when “Congress might well intend
for the law to be interpreted in a way that raises constitutional doubts”); Schauer, supra note 13, at
74 (1995) (“[I]n interpreting statutes so as to avoid ‘unnecessary’ constitutional decisions, the Court
frequently interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional
questions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred.”). I have previously discussed the
Court’s traditional account of constitutional avoidance and scholars’ reactions to it. See Charlotte
Garden, Religious Employers & Labor Law: Bargaining in Good Faith?, 96 B.U. L. REV. 109, 112 (2016)
(discussing that even if constitutional avoidance decisions are sometimes justiﬁed by normative
preferences to protect constitutional values, they should not be impervious to congressional override
as a practical matter).
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modern Congress sails close to the wind all the time. Federal statutes today
often all but acknowledge their questionable constitutionality . . . .”15 Perhaps
Congress would rather that the judiciary put the most likely reading of a
statute to the test by actually ruling on its constitutionality. The critique,
then, is that by invoking constitutional avoidance, courts purport to act
deferentially to the elected branches—but in truth, they are empowering
themselves to rewrite statutes, rules, or regulations in ways that Congress
never wanted or anticipated.16
These problems have been ampliﬁed in recent decades. First, the Court’s
methods of engaging in constitutional avoidance have changed.17 In some
recent cases, the Court has applied a clear statement rule instead of more
traditional tools of statutory interpretation—that is, it adopts a statutory
reading that avoids a constitutional question unless Congress responds by
clearly stating its intent to the contrary. When the Court does this, it usually
adopts an implausible statutory interpretation, throwing the onus onto
Congress to reiterate that it meant what it said the ﬁrst time around.18 And
the Court has sometimes adopted statutory interpretations in order to avoid
constitutional questions that seem insubstantial under existing law. In those
situations, avoidance seems unnecessary because the chances that the Court
would really invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds are slim, unless
the Court is prepared to undertake a major shift in constitutional law.19
Moreover, while it might be desirable for the Court and Congress to be in
15 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248 (2012); see also Posner, supra note 13, at 816
(discussing how the avoidance canon has the opposite eﬀect of ‘judicial activism’ by enabling the
courts to expand their power in relation to the other branches of government while appearing as if
they are being constrained).
16 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2002) (criticizing “activist” judges who “subscribe to in principle, and use
in practice, the noxious canon of constitutional doubt”); see also RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 176-77 (2006) (discussing, in the context of the Japanese Supreme Court,
how “[o]ne could view the Supreme Court’s practice of providing limiting constructions as a form of
judicial activism, rather than as the product of extreme judicial deference.”).
17 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1949 (comparing “modern avoidance” to “classical avoidance”).
18 At diﬀerent times, the Supreme Court has both used and criticized this approach. See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 843 (2018) (stating that “[s]potting a constitutional issue does
not give a court the authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases,” but also noting that the Court had
applied the canon in a more “notably generous” fashion in previous cases). For an example of this
approach, see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
19 The Court has sometimes applied the canon of constitutional avoidance aggressively. See,
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance By the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 181, 181-82 (2009) (discussing the Court’s application of constitutional avoidance in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)); Katyal &
Schmidt, supra note 12, at 2117 (discussing how modern avoidance can be triggered by varying levels
of constitutional doubts ranging from “any constitutional doubt, however weak and inarticulate, or
only by very grave doubts”).
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ongoing dialogue over the meaning of statutes,20 that dialogue is unlikely in
the face of legislative gridlock.21
A case from labor law—NLRB v. Catholic Bishop22—illustrates both the
Court’s call for a “clear statement” from Congress about its intent to legislate
in a way that the Court believes raises a constitutional question, and the
Court’s reliance on avoidance in the face of a constitutional question that
could seemingly be resolved easily and in Congress’s favor.23 In Catholic
Bishop, the Court applied a clear statement rule, holding that if Congress
intended the NLRA to cover parochial high schools, it would have to say so
explicitly—notwithstanding the fact that the NLRA’s deﬁnition of covered
employers is already very broad.24 The Court adopted this approach to avoid
a constitutional question about religious freedom that the Court never
deﬁned very clearly, and that the Court could have resolved in the NLRB’s
favor anyway.25 The result was a decision that diverged from the statutory
interpretation that most closely tracked the statutory text in order to avoid a
low or nonexistent probability that the Court would otherwise uphold the
parochial school’s as-applied challenge to the NLRA. Neal Katyal and
Thomas Schmidt recently condemned this approach as an exercise in
hypocrisy: “Avoidance decisions profess a Brandeisian reticence about the
judicial power, which . . . allows the Court to renovate the Constitution with
less visibility.”26
Recognizing the weakness of the Court’s insistence that constitutional
avoidance reflects judicial minimalism, some scholars have devised alternative
accounts. For example, some argue that avoidance protects constitutional rights
by forcing Congress to be explicit if it wants to approach the outer boundaries
of its legislative power.27 These accounts often focus on what their proponents
20 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue,
83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (discussing arguments for, and doctrinal barriers to, greater dialogue
between judges and legislatures).
21 For a discussion of the longstanding congressional logjam that has prevented labor law
reform, see Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1540-44 (2002).
22 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
23 See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1992) (discussing application of
modern constitutional avoidance through statutory construction in Catholic Bishop); Garden, supra
note 14, at 114 (presenting Catholic Bishop as an example of modern avoidance).
24 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
25 Garden, supra note 14, at 117 (“[T]he Supreme Court soon backed oﬀ the broad approach to
church autonomy that Catholic Bishop might have previewed.”).
26 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 12, at 2114, 2123 (“[T]he avoidance canon allows the Court to
make constitutional law . . . while deferring the institutional consequences of its decision.”).
27 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 249; see also William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 76 (1994) (discussing “super-strong clear
statement rules” that protect federalism norms); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.
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see as “underenforced” constitutional norms. For example, Scalia and Garner
argue that avoidance “represents judicial policy—a judgment that statutes ought
not to tread on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly.”28
Others have proposed that courts may engage in avoidance to preserve their
own legitimacy while protecting litigants’ rights in highly charged cases; Philip
Frickey’s account of the Court’s approach to protecting the rights of dissidents
in certain Cold War-era cases highlights this approach.29
These scholarly accounts recast avoidance as constitutional law-lite. They
shift the focus away from the Supreme Court’s claimed deference to Congress
in statutory interpretation and instead emphasize the importance of ﬁdelity
to the Constitution in diﬃcult cases. This approach makes a virtue of the fact
that Congress rarely overrides the Supreme Court’s avoidance decisions.30 To
scholarly defenders of constitutional avoidance, congressional inaction is a
sign that the Court’s use of avoidance has successfully served its purpose,
rather than a signal that there has been a breakdown in the “conversation”
between the courts and Congress.31
Yet neither the Court’s own account of constitutional avoidance nor the
reasoning of its scholarly defenders adequately grapples with the many costs
of constitutional avoidance. One of these overlooked costs is that avoidance

L. REV. 315, 331 (2000) (“[C]onstitutionally sensitive questions . . . will not be permitted to arise
unless the constitutionally designated lawmaker has deliberately and expressly chosen to raise
them.”); Young, supra note 3, at 1598 (suggesting that avoidance protects constitutional rights by
ensuring Congress has enough political support for clear restrictions of those rights).
28 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 249 (emphasis in original).
29 Frickey, supra note 3, at 401, 455 (2005) (discussing the use of avoidance in the context of
“underenforced” constitutional norms and writing that “[b]y generally deciding these cases at the
subconstitutional level through the rules of avoidance, the Court used techniques that might defuse
political opposition while incrementally adjusting public law to better respect individual liberty”);
see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 516 (2005) (reasoning that “judicial political
capital is not inﬁnite. Courts routinely striking down legislative enactments might quickly lose favor
with the body politic . . . .”).
30 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 12, at 2119 (discussing the diﬃculty of ﬁxing a law once it
is rewritten by the Court); see also Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose
and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1957) (“To raise constitutional
doubts is to inhibit future legislative action.”).
31 Scholars have documented myriad reasons for congressional inaction, both speciﬁcally on
the topic of labor law, and more generally. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 440-43 (2012) (discussing, in the
context of contests between Congress and the executive branch, impediments to congressional
action, including “‘veto-gates’ in Congress at which legislative proposals . . . can be defeated,” as
well as “substantial collective action problems,” and competing incentives that act as opposing forces
on members of Congress); Estlund, supra note 21, at 1540-41 (arguing that Congress’s inability to
enact labor law reform “stems primarily from the fact that, for many decades, both organized labor
and especially employers have had enough support in Congress to block any signiﬁcant amendment
that either group strongly opposes”).
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decisions distort or inhibit the development of substantive law.32 The next
Part uses labor law to demonstrate how this happens.
II. HOW AVOIDANCE CREEPS
Constitutional avoidance is recurrent in labor law.33 In addition to the
Catholic Bishop decision discussed in Part I, avoidance has also inﬂuenced
decisions concerning union and employer organizing tactics, including
“secondary” strikes,34 picketing,35 petitioning,36 and sit-down strikes.37 Courts
also engage in constitutional avoidance when applying the NLRA’s
prohibition on using the expression of “views, argument, or opinion” as
evidence in an unfair labor practice proceeding,38 and cases about whether

32 This Article focuses on constitutional avoidance, but scholars have also charged that other
court-created decisional rules can distort substantive doctrine. Consider, for example, the doctrine
of qualiﬁed immunity, which some scholars argue has stunted development of the law across a wide
range of constitutional rights by allowing courts to refuse to answer questions they ﬁnd diﬃcult or
demanding. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 432-33 (2012) (arguing that
“qualiﬁed immunity suppresses lawmaking in a couple of ways”).
33 The most prominent constitutional avoidance case in the labor law canon might be thought
to be NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., in which the Court famously held that Congress could
regulate labor relations under the Commerce Clause, in part because “the [NLRA] may be construed
so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority.” 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
One story to tell about Jones & Laughlin is that by choosing to construe the NLRA narrowly,
the Court moderated a major constitutional shift, holding only that Congress could regulate large
businesses with operations that spanned multiple states. But on the same day, the Supreme Court
also upheld the application of the NLRA to a smaller employer—a clothing manufacturer that
operated a single plant. NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937). This
employer operated within an interstate supply chain (it purchased raw materials from out-of-state
and sold its ﬁnished products out of state) and it had out-of-state competitors, but its manufacturing
operation was contained within Virginia. Id. at 59, 72-78. Nonetheless, the Court held that the
NLRA could constitutionally be applied, “[f]or the reasons stated in” Jones & Laughlin. Id. at 75. I
am grateful to James Gray Pope for the observation that Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing implies that
there was more going on in Jones & Laughlin than met the eye.
34 See infra Section II.B.
35 See infra Section II.B.
36 See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 518-19 (2002) (holding that the NLRA
“need not be read so broadly as to reach the entire class of cases the Board has deemed retaliatory”).
37 See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939) (holding that sit-down
strikers lost both their status as “employees” and the protection of the NLRA and therefore could
not be ordered reinstated, even though their sit-down strike was in response to an unfair labor
practice by their employer, and stating that “[a]part from the question of the constitutional validity
[of a statute that protected sit-down strikes] it is enough to say that such a legislative intention
should be found in some deﬁnite and unmistakable expression”); see also James Gray Pope, How
American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 521-22 (2004)
(discussing the role of constitutional avoidance in Fansteel).
38 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2018); see also Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 US.
359, 386 (1998) (writing that this NLRA provision “merely implements the First Amendment”).
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unions have a right to access employers’ property for organizing purposes.39
And the Court relied on avoidance in holding that unions governed by the
Railway Labor Act could not require represented workers to do anything
more than pay their share of the union’s representation costs, before
extending that rule to both the NLRA context and the public sector,40 where
it continues to generate conﬂict.
This Part traces the inﬂuence of constitutional avoidance on the
development of labor law in two areas: union dues and fees; and secondary
boycotts. A careful examination of these areas reveals detrimental
consequences of constitutional avoidance, which are attributable to later
courts’ misinterpretation or manipulation of earlier courts’ avoidance-based
decisions.
A. Avoidance and Doctrinal Evolution
Ill-considered or under-explained avoidance rationales can infect later cases
in two ways. First, once a court has stated that a statute raises a constitutional
question, a future court may assume that the statute would have been struck
down as unconstitutional had it been interpreted in a broader fashion. This
assumption can lead courts to expand or reify the broad constitutional reasoning
that is typical of modern avoidance decisions. Or, after a court interprets a
statute in an unconventional way in order to avoid a constitutional question—
such as by applying a clear statement rule—a future court confronted with a
similar statutory interpretation question may assume that its case should come
out the same way as the avoidance case, even if the later case presents no
constitutional question. The Court’s case law regarding union dues and fees41—
much of which traces back to the avoidance decision International Ass’n of
Machinists v. Street42—exemplifies both of these versions of avoidance creep.
Although Street is the main focus of this section, the Supreme Court’s case
law on union fees actually begins with Railway Employees’ Department v.

39 See Pope, supra note 37, at 551 (showing how, in a series of cases involving clashes between
employer common law rights and the NLRA, “[s]tate common law rights of property and contract
were elevated above federal statutory rights of self-organization and collective action through
Lochner-era notions of economic due process and interstate commerce”).
40 See infra subsections II.A.1–3.
41 Workers who opt to become union members pay membership dues. Non-members do not pay
dues, but represented workers who decline union membership can sometimes be required to contribute
towards their share of the union’s representational costs. This is called an “agency fee,” because it
represents a pro rata share of the costs the union incurs in its work as the bargaining agent for a group
of workers. See e.g., COMMC’NS WORKERS OF AMERICA, UNION OPERATING PROCEDURES
MANUAL (describing the difference between union dues and agency fees); see also infra note 45
(discussing the requirement that the union members in Hanson were required to pay union dues).
42 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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Hanson,43 a case involving a 1951 amendment to the federal Railway Labor Act
(RLA) that allowed unions and employers to “make agreements, requiring
[that] . . . all employees shall become members of the labor organization
representing their craft or class.”44 This authorization reversed the RLA’s
earlier language prohibiting what are known as “union security” or “union
shop” agreements, which meant unions had to rely on represented workers to
choose to join the union in suﬃcient numbers to support its activities.45 The
problem with this “open shop” model was its interaction with another part of
labor law: namely, the Supreme Court’s 1944 ruling in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad that unions must fairly represent each worker in a given
bargaining unit.46 The Steele rule was adopted to prohibit race discrimination
by unions, but an incidental eﬀect was to create a free-rider problem: once a
union was elected as the exclusive representative of a group of workers, it
would be required to give fair and equal treatment to each of them, whether
or not they paid union dues.47 Accordingly, Congress’s 1951 amendment
reﬂected the policy that “those who enjoy the fruits and the beneﬁts of the
unions should make a fair contribution to the support of the unions.”48
The plaintiffs in Hanson argued that the RLA-authorized union security
clauses in their collective bargaining agreements violated the First Amendment
by requiring them to join (and pay dues to) the union elected to represent
them.49 Thus, their first hurdle was to establish that a clause in an agreement
bargained and signed by a union and a railway employer—both private
entities—involved state action. Remarkably, the Court agreed that it did,
351 U.S. 225 (1956).
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (2018). The relevant provision of the RLA states that “any
carrier . . . and a labor organization . . . duly designated and authorized to represent
employees . . . shall be permitted . . . to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued
employment, that . . . all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing
their craft or class,” as long as the union provides membership on equal terms to each employee and
does not terminate membership “for any reason other than the failure of the employee” to pay dues.
Id. See also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 229 n.2 (referencing the same Code language).
45 Hanson, 351 U.S. at 231. In labor law, “union security” and “union shop” are not
interchangeable phrases, although the Court sometimes treats them as though they are. A “union
shop” clause is a variety of union security clause in which represented workers are required to join
the union that represents them within some number of days of being hired. Other types of union
security clauses include the “closed shop,” which requires workers to be union members before they
are hired; the “agency shop,” which requires workers to pay their share of the union’s representation
costs; and “open shop,” which does not require workers to join or pay money to the union that
represents them. SETH D. HARRIS, ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS 1142 (2d ed. 2016).
46 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944).
47 For a discussion of the free rider problem, see Martin H. Malin & Catherine Fisk,
After Janus 107 C ALIF. L. R EV. 1821, 1826-29 (2019).
48 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 231 (quoting Senator Hill, 96 CONG. REC. 16279 (1950)).
49 Id. at 236.
43
44
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reasoning that “the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by
which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.”50 In other words, the Court
concluded that the First Amendment’s state action requirement was satisfied
because the RLA preempted a state right-to-work law that would have otherwise
prohibited the union membership clause that the plaintiffs were challenging.51
Despite having sided with the plaintiﬀs on what must have seemed at the
outset like the largest of their doctrinal hurdles, the Court concluded that
“union shop” clauses did not, on their faces, violate the First Amendment in
light of the public policy reasons to allow them.52 Still, the Court left the door
open to future cases in which plaintiﬀs could show that “compulsory [union]
membership will be used to impair freedom of expression.”53
The Court then listed in a lengthy footnote some union practices that it
presumably thought might impair workers’ freedom of expression, and that
it might strike down in a future as-applied challenge.54 Those practices fell
into three categories: disqualiﬁcation from union membership (and therefore
from employment) of workers who held certain political beliefs or
associations; prohibitions on workers taking political positions contrary to the
unions’ positions; and the use of union dues to “ﬁnance union insurance and
death beneﬁt plans.”55 If one accepts the Court’s conclusion that state action
was present, it is self-evident why the ﬁrst two categories of membership
conditions and rules would then violate represented workers’ First
Amendment rights. The third example is less obvious. It refers to a practice,
described at length in Hanson’s Supreme Court brief, wherein a union would
require workers to buy into a union insurance fund while also threatening
that workers would lose accrued beneﬁts if they violated union rules, which
in turn required that the worker not “work[] in the interest of any

Id. at 232.
Scholars sometimes refer to the landmark case Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as the
high-water mark in the Court’s willingness to ﬁnd state action in connection with private contracts.
See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 23, 37 n.48 (2006) (positing that Shelley v. Kraemer was the high-water mark of expansive
state action doctrine). However, as this discussion shows, Hanson actually went beyond (and relied
on) Shelley. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 850 (2012) (observing that Hanson was “decided at the apex of the
Court’s willingness to ﬁnd state action implicated in private conduct”). For a discussion of the
Court’s “puzzling” state action holding in Hanson, see generally Joseph E. Slater, Will Labor Law
Prompt Conservative Justices to Adopt a Radical Theory of State Action?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 62, 77 (2017).
52 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233 (reasoning that “[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce is a
legitimate objective; and Congress has great latitude in choosing the methods by which it is to be obtained”).
53 Id. at 238.
54 Id. at 236 n.8.
55 Id.
50
51
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organization or cause which is detrimental to, or opposed to” the union, nor
circulate certain political materials.56
Thus, each of the Court’s examples of union practices that might yield a
successful as-applied challenge involved the union leveraging a union shop
clause to limit workers’ own political activity. The negative implication is that
the Court did not think workers’ First Amendment rights were implicated by
what the union did with dues after it received them. This is signiﬁcant because
it was known at the time (and the Hanson Court was presumably aware) that
unions used member dues to ﬁnance their own lobbying and politicking.57
Five years later, the Court in Street took up the question reserved in
Hanson in the context of a challenge to a union’s use of member dues for its
own political speech.58 The Street plaintiﬀs argued that their contractual
obligation to pay union representation fees violated the First Amendment
because the union used a portion of that money “to ﬁnance the campaigns of
candidates for federal and state oﬃces whom [the plaintiﬀs] opposed.”59 The
plaintiﬀs won their case in Georgia state court, which then enjoined the
railroad and union from enforcing their contractual union shop clause, or
collecting any dues from the plaintiﬀs, and the Georgia Supreme Court later
upheld that order.60
Before the Supreme Court, the union made two main arguments: ﬁrst,
that the state action rule from Hanson did not apply because Georgia did not
have an applicable right-to-work law, and therefore there was nothing for the
RLA to preempt; and second, that there was no First Amendment right not
to pay fees that were later used for union political speech.61 Each of those
arguments had at least implicit support from Hanson.
However, the Street Court did not address either argument head on.
Instead, it invoked avoidance:
The record in this case is adequate squarely to present the constitutional
questions reserved in Hanson. . . . However, the restraints against
unnecessary constitutional decisions counsel against their determination
unless we must conclude that Congress, in authorizing a union shop under
[the RLA], also meant that the labor organization receiving an employee’s
Brief of Respondent at 14-15, Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (No. 451).
See Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of
Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 51-52 (1961) (observing that general information about
unions’ participation in politics was before the Hanson Court, and concluding that most observers
after Hanson would have assumed that the Court would not ﬁnd that unions’ use of dues to fund
their own political activities poses a First Amendment problem).
58 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
59 Id. at 744.
60 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 108 S.E.2d 796, 809 (Ga. 1959).
61 Brief of Appellants at 22, 44, Street, 367 U.S. 740 (No. 258).
56
57
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money should be free, despite that employee’s objection, to spend his money
for political causes which he opposes.62

In other words, because Hanson reserved the question whether workers
might bring a successful as-applied constitutional challenge to a union
security clause that restrained their own political advocacy, the Street Court
concluded that the entirely diﬀerent constitutional question presented in that
case was a serious or diﬃcult one.63 Then, without any more analysis of that
question, the Court turned to whether the RLA could be construed to
prohibit unions and employers from requiring represented workers to pay
union fees that went towards the union’s political advocacy. 64
The relevant RLA text refers broadly to “membership” and “dues”
without any restrictions on their use.65 However, the Street Court paid only
glancing attention to that language, instead turning to the purpose of the 1951
RLA amendment as reﬂected in its legislative history: to ensure that unions
had enough money to represent workers competently and fairly.66 In the
Court’s view, that purpose could be accomplished even if mandatory fees were
limited to union representation costs, such as bargaining and processing
worker grievances. But then the Court subtly shifted its inquiry. Instead of
attempting to discern the meaning of the language that Congress did use, it
“look[ed] in vain for any suggestion that Congress also meant . . . to provide
the unions with a means for forcing employees, over their objection, to
support political causes which they oppose.”67 That is, to avoid constitutional
questions that the Street majority said would be raised if mandatory fees could
go to union politicking, the Court adopted a clear statement approach to
interpreting the RLA: if Congress meant to authorize union security clauses
that required represented workers to pay full union dues (including the

Street, 367 U.S. at 749.
Id. Concurring, Justice Douglas addressed the First Amendment question (but not the state
action question) head on, writing that “use of union funds for political purposes subordinates the
individual’s First Amendment rights to the views of the majority. I do not see how that can be done,”
though he also observed that the “furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway for the
leadership of the group.” Id. at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring). No other Justice joined this opinion.
64 Id. at 749.
65 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (2018).
66 Street, 367 U.S. at 760-61 (observing that a union’s representation duties “entail[] the
expenditure of considerable funds” in part because of the duty of fair representation).
67 Id. at 764. Later in Street, the majority also observed that the legislative history of the 1951
amendment revealed “congressional concern over possible impingements on the interests of
individual [union] dissenters” and that “Congress was also fully conversant with the long history of
intensive involvement of the railroad unions in political activities.” Id. at 766-67. But those two
observations just as easily cut against the majority’s reading of the RLA, because they suggest
Congress was aware that unions used dues for political purposes but still did not impose clear limits
on the purposes to which mandatory dues could be put.
62
63
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portion that went to union expenses that were not germane to collective
bargaining), it would have to say so explicitly.
Constitutional avoidance appears to have been the but-for cause of the
result in Street, that RLA-governed unions and employers may require
represented workers to pay union dues and fees only to the extent they go
towards collective bargaining and other representation costs.68 That is because
the RLA’s text did not limit the uses to which unions could put dues. Indeed,
Justice Black dissented, excoriating the majority for “distort[ing] this statute
so as to deprive unions of rights I think Congress tried to give them,” deeming
the majority’s approach “wholly unfair to the unions as well as to Congress.”69
One might expect that Street would be only of limited importance in
future cases, as it neither represents the most straightforward reading of the
RLA, nor purports to answer any of the constitutional questions about how
unions may use worker dues and fees. This is not to say that future courts
should have treated Street (or any other avoidance decision) as
nonprecedential, but rather that future courts should have been attentive to
two limits of avoidance decisions: ﬁrst, they are not constitutional decisions;
and second, they may construe statutory language contrary to its most likely
meaning or to Congress’s most likely intent. However, the Court’s post-Street
union fees cases do not bear out this intuition. As the next two subparts
discuss, those cases rely on Street both as though it were a constitutional
decision, and as though it reﬂects the “best” reading of the RLA, with
signiﬁcant consequences for unions and represented workers.
1. Street as Constitutional Law
In 1977, more than ﬁfteen years after Street, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of union security in the public sector. The resulting decision
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education not only relied heavily on Street, but
reached the same functional outcome, holding as a matter of constitutional
law that public sector employees can be required to contribute towards a
union’s representation costs, but not its other expenses.70
The Court began its analysis by writing that Hanson and Street “on their
face go far toward resolving the issue.”71 But Hanson’s role in the analysis that
followed was quite limited. Instead, the Court turned mainly to Street,
Id. at 764.
Id. at 785, 786 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black would have held that mandatory fees
violated the First Amendment rights of objecting workers. Id. at 791.
70 431 U.S. 209, 219, 232, 240 (1977) (characterizing the Street case as involving a “similar
question”; concluding that Hanson and Street were “controlling in the present case insofar as the
service charges are applied to collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievanceadjustment purposes”; and writing that the same remedy that was awarded in Street was appropriate).
71 Id. at 217.
68
69
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beginning with that Court’s statement that the use of union fees for politics
triggered “questions of the utmost gravity.”72 But although the Street Court
wrote that to explain its decision to use avoidance, it oﬀered no analysis of
why those questions were grave rather than trivial—or even what the
questions were. It could be that the Street Court thought questions such as
“Do mandatory union fees trigger First Amendment scrutiny at all?” or “Is
there state action present when the RLA applies in a state without an
applicable right to work law?” presented diﬃcult or even “grave” issues. But
Abood simply assumed that the answer to that ﬁrst question was “yes,” and
then turned to a discussion of why public sector agency fees were justiﬁed by
a government interest in labor peace. The interest in labor peace was a
construct that Abood also attributed to Street, writing that “the judgment
clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference [with represented
workers’ First Amendment rights] as exists is constitutionally justiﬁed by the
legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the
system of labor relations established by Congress.”73 In other words, Abood
(mis)attributed to Hanson and Street both that how a union spends workers’
dues implicates workers’ First Amendment rights, and that agency fees were
suﬃciently justiﬁed under some (unspeciﬁed) level of scrutiny by the
government’s interest in stable labor relations.74
To be clear, neither Hanson nor Street actually held either of these things.
First, Hanson simply held that required “periodic dues, initiation fees, and
assessments” did not violate the First Amendment, without saying whether
that was because the First Amendment did not cover mandatory union dues
or because there was a suﬃcient government interest to justify the intrusion
on First Amendment interests.75 And in Street, the plaintiﬀs challenged only
the portion of union dues that went to union politics, and the Court did not
provide a more detailed account of the First Amendment holding in Hanson.76
Instead, the Street Court assumed only that a plausible constitutional question
arises when mandatory union dues go towards union politics.77 Then, its
Id. at 219-20 (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 749-50).
Id. at 222. The Court also noted that “[t]o compel employees ﬁnancially to support their
collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests.” Id.
74 For a discussion of the distinction between First Amendment coverage (the idea that the
First Amendment is applicable to speech or conduct in the ﬁrst place), and First Amendment
protection (the idea that government regulation of particular speech is unconstitutional under the
applicable First Amendment test), see Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-74 (2004).
75 Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
76 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 746-49 (1961) (explaining Hanson).
77 The Court noted that
72
73

the restraints against unnecessary constitutional decisions counsel against their
determination unless we must conclude that Congress, in authorizing a union shop
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entire discussion of the link between agency fees and the government’s
interest in labor peace was connected with its statutory holding limiting the
RLA’s union shop authorization.78
Thus, it appears that the Abood Court conflated the constitutional
holding in Hanson and the statutory holding in Street, and then treated
Street’s outcome—agency fees are permissible under the RLA, but full union
dues are not—as though it was the result of First Amendment balancing.79
From there, it was an easy step to reach the same outcome regarding another
set of workers.80
Today, we think of the principle that compelled subsidization of a third
party’s speech implicates the First Amendment as having begun with Abood.81
Remarkably, though, the Abood Court seemed to think that principle came
from Hanson and Street.82 Thus, the careful consideration that a signiﬁcant
expansion of First Amendment coverage normally merits simply was not
present—instead, that conclusion was smuggled in by way of reliance on
Street’s use of avoidance.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court could not have reached the same
conclusion in Abood without misapplying Hanson and Street—perhaps it would
have. But at the same time, Abood’s result was not inevitable. For example,
Professors Eugene Volokh and William Baude persuasively argued in an amicus
under § 2, Eleventh, also meant that the labor organization receiving an employee’s
money should be free, despite that employee’s objection, to spend his money for
political causes which he opposes.
Id. at 749.
78 Id. at 768 (discussing the congressional purpose for union security clauses).
79 Alternatively, it may be that the Abood majority overlooked that the Street plaintiﬀs’ case
centered on the portion of their union assessment that went towards politics, and therefore assumed
that Street involved both a constitutional holding allowing agency fees in the RLA context and a
statutory holding construing the RLA to disallow mandatory union dues for political purposes. But
that account of the Abood Court’s reading of Street would still be consistent with my argument that
the Abood majority imported Street’s discussion of “the legislative assessment of the important
contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.” Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
80 Id. at 229 (writing, following a discussion of Street, that the “remaining constitutional
inquiry . . . is whether a public employee has a weightier First Amendment interest than a private
employee in not being compelled to contribute to the costs of exclusive union representation. We
think he does not.”).
81 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997) (quoting Wileman
Bros & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1377 (9th Cir. 1995)) (citing to Abood for the assertion that
“just as the First Amendment prohibits compelled speech, it prohibits . . . compelling an individual
to ‘render ﬁnancial support for others’ speech’”).
82 Abood, 431 U.S. at 217, 222 (writing that “whether an agency-shop provision” is
“constitutionally valid must begin with two cases in this Court that on their face go far toward
resolving the issue,” and citing Hanson and Street; and then analyzing those cases before writing
without additional citation that “[t]o compel employees ﬁnancially to support their collectivebargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests”).
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brief and a follow-up law review article that Abood erred in treating compelled
payments as covered by the First Amendment at all, particularly in light of the
myriad ways in which Americans are routinely compelled to subsidize others’
speech, including through their taxes.83 Professor Benjamin Sachs reached the
same conclusion for a different reason, writing that we should think of agency
fees as being paid by employers rather than employees for First Amendment
purposes.84 Other scholars have pointed out that compelled subsidization issues
arise frequently both in and out of the context of public employment, but that
only a small subset of those situations are routinely treated by courts as raising
First Amendment issues—perhaps there exists a principle that would separate
wheat from chaff, but Abood did not provide it.85
2. Street as Mixed Constitutional and Statutory Law
The consequences of Abood’s treatment of Street are now fully apparent,
due to a new round of First Amendment lawsuits challenging public sector
agency fees.86 In Harris v. Quinn,87 the Court struck down on First
Amendment grounds mandatory agency fees for certain home healthcare
workers who were paid by the government, but whose work was directed by
individual private clients. The Harris Court criticized Abood’s reading of

83 See Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh & William Baude as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at *5-6, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466); Eugene Volokh &
William Baude, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 171 (2018) (“The
better view, we think, is that requiring people only to pay money, whether to private organizations
or to the government, is not a First Amendment problem at all.”).
84 Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1048 (2018)
(explaining that the NLRA and subsequent state public sectors laws prohibited employers from
paying unions directly, leading to an accounting ﬁction wherein the employers “pay” their employees
money earmarked for and passed through to the unions).
85 See, e.g., Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 213-14 (2005) (listing circumstances in which individuals are
required to convey certain messages, but which are not thought to implicate the First Amendment
right against compelled speech); Sachs, supra note 51, at 827 (drawing parallels between agency fees
and other situations in which “economic power to control access to signiﬁcant economic
opportunities is deployed to secure political support for the economic actor’s political agenda”).
86 Between Abood and the cases discussed in this subsection, the Court decided several cases
regarding the conditions under which public sector unions could collect agency fees. Like Abood,
some of these cases also rely on Hanson and Street in order to answer constitutional questions about
the scope of represented workers’ rights to opt out of union dues and fees in the public sector. For
example, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, the Court delineated several categories of expenses that
were or were not chargeable to represented public sector workers. 500 U.S. 507, 519-24 (1991). In
Lehnert, the Court relied extensively on Street, observing that while Street was a statutory case, the
fact that it involved constitutional avoidance meant that it would “necessarily provide some guidance
regarding what the First Amendment will countenance in the realm of union support of political
activities through mandatory assessments.” Id. at 516.
87 573 U.S. 616 (2014).
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Hanson and Street on much the same ground that I have here,88 but drew the
wrong conclusion from that criticism.
Speciﬁcally, the Harris majority—quoting Street’s “grave questions”
language—criticized Abood for relying on Street, which was “not a
constitutional decision at all,”89 to reach the conclusion that the impingement
on First Amendment rights caused by agency fees could be supported by a
government interest in labor peace.90 That is, the Harris majority thought that
because Street was a statutory decision, it was insuﬃciently protective of
workers’ First Amendment rights and too accepting of the “labor peace”
rationale.91 But the opposite is true: because Street relied on constitutional
avoidance, it might have over-protected objecting workers by narrowing the
RLA to avoid questions about objectors’ constitutional rights that would have
ultimately been resolved against them. Then, Street imported the labor peace
rationale only as a way to limit union fees, rather than to justify them, in order
to avoid deciding whether it would be constitutional to require union
members to pay fees that a union ultimately spends on politics—with the
implication that the Street Court thought it was not even arguably a
constitutional problem to require union-represented workers to pay agency
fees. This misreading of Street is signiﬁcant because it apparently led the
Harris Court to disregard Street and Hanson as precedent supporting the
constitutionality of agency fees, based on the Harris Court’s belief that Street
and Hanson were mere statutory decisions. That in turn helped the Harris
Court (and, as discussed below, the Janus Court) paint Abood as an isolated,
anomalous decision that should be overturned.
This insight does not on its own resolve the constitutionality of agency
fees—but the point is that if one traces Harris back to Hanson, one ﬁnds overreadings of precedent all the way down—where earlier Courts left questions,
later Courts saw answers.
Four years later, the Court overturned Abood in Janus v. AFSCME.92 The
majority opinions in Harris and Janus were both written by Justice Alito, and
so it is unsurprising that the two decisions treated Street and Abood similarly.
In Janus, as in Harris, the Court majority assumed that Abood was right when
it read Street as holding that compelled subsidization of speech implicates the
First Amendment,93 but wrong when it held that it was appropriate to apply
Id. at 633-38.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 633-35.
138 S.Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018).
Id. at 2464 (stating that “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private
speakers raises similar First Amendment concerns [as compelling a person to speak],” and citing
Abood and later cases that relied on Abood).
88
89
90
91
92
93
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the rest of the analysis from Street—getting Street’s constitutional implications
backwards.94 For example, the Janus Court wrote that “neither Hanson nor
Street gave careful consideration to the First Amendment . . . For its part,
Street was decided as a matter of statutory construction, and so did not reach
any constitutional issue.”95 This statement is literally correct, but the Janus
majority drew the wrong conclusion from it: implicit in the logic of Street’s
constitutional avoidance is that union fees that go towards politics might (or
might not) violate workers’ First Amendment rights, and union fees that go
towards representation costs presumably do not. In other words, the Janus
Court’s view that Street should be discounted as just a statutory decision, and
that the Abood Court was wrong to rely on Street as relevant precedent,96 was
based on an apparent misreading of Street.
What, if anything, does this line of cases show about avoidance more
generally? It is not inevitable that courts will over-read avoidance decisions,
morphing statutory analysis into constitutional principles over time. But the
Hanson-Street-Abood-Harris-Janus progression shows how later courts can get
avoidance decisions wrong in multiple ways: whereas Abood erred by treating
Street as having resolved questions that it only avoided, Harris and Janus erred
in a diﬀerent way by treating Street as a statutory decision that did not
consider constitutional questions at all. And although it is possible that none
of these errors were dispositive, there is also the possibility that they altered
the course of constitutional law regarding compelled subsidization of speech.
3. Street as Statutory Interpretation.
In addition to its inﬂuence in constitutional cases, Street also drove the
Court’s decision in Communications Workers of America v. Beck,97 which held
that private sector employees cannot be required to pay full union dues under
contracts governed by the NLRA—instead, like in the RLA context, they can
be required to pay only agency fees.98 Beck was similar to Street in two key
ways: ﬁrst, the nature of the challenge was similar; and second, the statutory
provision at issue, § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, is substantially identical to the
RLA’s union security provision.99 Accordingly, the Beck Court viewed Street
94 Id. at 2465, 2479-80 (criticizing Abood for failing to cite “evidence that the pandemonium it
imagined would result if agency fees were not allowed,” and for “fail[ing] to appreciate that a very
diﬀerent First Amendment question arises when a State requires its employees to pay agency fees,”
in its reliance on Street).
95 Id. at 2479.
96 Id. at 2479 (criticizing “Abood’s unwarranted reliance on Hanson and Street”).
97 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
98 Id. at 762-63.
99 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2018) (making it an unfair labor practice for employers to
discriminate based on union membership, except under a contract “to require as a condition of
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as the beginning and end of its analysis, writing that “[o]ur decision in
Street . . . is far more than merely instructive here: we believe it is controlling,
for § 8(a)(3) and [the RLA] are in all material respects identical.”100
But there are two related reasons to doubt the logic of importing Street
into the NLRA context, as the Beck dissenters explained. First, there is no
obvious reason for the Beck Court to have invoked avoidance independently—
unlike the RLA, the NLRA does not preempt state right-to-work laws,101 and
so Hanson provides no basis to assume that NLRA-governed contracts involve
state action.102 Moreover, it was nonsensical for the Beck Court to assume that
a judicial interpretation of the RLA should control in the NLRA context
because § 8(a)(3) predates not just Street but also the existence of RLA’s union
security provision itself; § 8(a)(3) was the basis for the 1951 RLA amendment,
rather than vice versa. This means Congress neither could have foreseen the
chain of events that eventually led to Street when it enacted § 8(a)(3), nor
would have intended § 8(a)(3) to be interpreted like its (as-yet nonexistent)
RLA analogue. Thus, even if it is sometimes reasonable to assume that
Congress legislated with knowledge of how the Court has interpreted (or is
likely to interpret) similar statutory language, this is not such a situation.
Instead, one imagines that the 1947 Congress that enacted § 8(a)(3) would
have been quite surprised to learn that the impetus behind the Court’s
eventual interpretation of its work would turn out to be a desire not to decide
whether railroad workers could constitutionally be required to pay union
dues. Second, neither the text of § 8(a)(3) nor its legislative history suggests
an independent basis upon which the Beck Court could reasonably have
decided that case in the same way. As the Beck dissenters observed—echoing
Justice Black’s dissent in Street—“[o]ur accepted mode of resolving statutory
questions would not lead to a construction of § 8(a)(3) so foreign to that
section’s express language and legislative history.”103

employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the eﬀective date of such agreement”).
100 Beck, 487 U.S at 745.
101 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2018).
102 The NLRA permits states to adopt what are colloquially known as “right to work” laws,
which prohibit employers and unions from requiring union membership as a condition of
employment. Id. Beck has also inﬂuenced the relatively broad construction of this statutory provision
to permit laws that prohibit employers and unions from requiring represented workers for paying
anything towards the cost of union representation. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs,
Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 857, 864-65 (2014) (discussing Beck
and arguing that a proper reading of § 164(b) does not cover laws allowing workers to opt out of
paying their share of enforcing collective bargaining agreements).
103 Beck, 487 U.S at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part dissenting in part). Similarly, scholars
have argued that Beck’s interpretation of 8(a)(3) is inconsistent with the NLRA’s structure and text.
See Fisk & Sachs, supra note 102, at 861-62.
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The foregoing Section shows how a single decision built on constitutional
avoidance can shape-shift into other areas of both constitutional and statutory
law, even when that decision’s reliance on avoidance should undermine its
uses in those other contexts. Yet Street is entirely responsible for the treatment
of union security clauses in the NLRA context, and at least partially
responsible for their treatment in the public sector—a remarkable (and
troubling) reach for a statutory decision that on its face aﬀected only
unionized railroad workers.
B. Avoidance and Doctrinal Stagnation
This Section turns to another example of how constitutional avoidance
has shaped labor law: the law of secondary strikes and boycotts.104 It begins
with a short primer on the law of secondary activity and its modern-day
signiﬁcance, before discussing the relevant constitutional avoidance
decisions. Finally, it argues that the Court’s use of constitutional avoidance
in this area has, as a practical matter, stymied the law’s development. That is,
constitutional avoidance has contributed to courts’ failures to directly
confront the increasing divergence between the NLRA’s secondary boycott
provision and increasingly speech-protective First Amendment law.
1. Secondary Activity under the NLRA: An Overview
On January 27, 2017, President Trump announced the ﬁrst iteration of his
controversial travel ban, barring citizens of seven Muslim–majority countries
from entering the United States.105 The next day, the New York Taxi Workers
Alliance (NYTWA) called for a one-hour strike at JFK airport in protest,
garnering signiﬁcant media attention about the eﬀects of the travel ban.106
Several days later, a group of Yemeni bodega owners adapted the NYTWA

104 ”Strike” refers to a coordinated cessation of work by employees. See Strike, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In labor law, the term “boycott” is sometimes used to refer to a strike,
and sometimes to a refusal by consumers to buy a product or patronize a business. This Article
generally refers to the latter as a “consumer boycott.” (The use of “boycott” to refer to a strike in
the relevant statutory language is discussed in more detail below.) This section also discusses
“handbilling,” which involves passing short pamphlets or other written material to passers-by in
order to persuade them to take (or not take) certain actions; and picketing, which “generally involves
persons carrying picket signs and patrolling back and forth before an entrance to a business or
worksite.” In re United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 355 N.L.R.B.
797, 802 (2010). As the Section discusses, the precise legal deﬁnition of “picketing” is a signiﬁcant
issue in labor law.
105 Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
106 Eli Blumenthal, The Scene at JFK as Taxi Drivers Strike Following Trump’s Immigration Ban, USA
TODAY (Jan. 28, 2017, 8:15 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/01/28/taxi-drivers-strikejfk-airport-following-trumps-immigration-ban/97198818/ [https://perma.cc/KR8N-QL79].
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strategy, also striking in protest of the travel ban, closing their stores for part
of a day and gathering in Brooklyn to object to the ban.107
From a labor law perspective, it is important that neither the NYTWA
nor the group of bodega owners was a labor union (or in NLRA parlance,
“labor organizations”).108 Instead, the NYTWA is an “alt-labor” group,109
because although it advocates for better working conditions for taxi and other
for-hire drivers, it mostly represents independent contractors, and does not
engage in traditional collective bargaining.110
This distinction matters because the Taxi Workers’ strike was a “secondary
strike,” in which the strikers withheld their labor from the enterprise for
which they worked (the “primary”) in order to inﬂuence the behavior of
another enterprise (the “secondary”)—here, the government. Calling
secondary strikes and boycotts to protest government policy is a time-tested
tactic that the Supreme Court has recognized as core political advocacy. For
example, the events that gave rise to the landmark case NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,111 involved an NAACP-organized secondary consumer boycott
of Mississippi businesses to protest segregationist government policies.112
Reversing a state court decision ﬁnding the NAACP liable for malicious
interference with the aﬀected businesses, as well as for violations of state
statutory law, the Supreme Court observed that “the practice of persons
sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end is deeply
embedded in the American political process.”113
Moving from the political to the labor context, it is easy to see how
secondary strikes and boycotts are a useful tool for unions: workers hoping to
influence a primary employer could increase both their leverage and the
visibility of their cause by calling on sympathizers to strike and/or picket the
premises of organizations that do business with their employer. Yet, as
discussed in more detail below, the NLRA forecloses labor unions from these
107 Adam Chandler, The Yemeni Bodega Strike, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/yemen-bodega-brooklyn-immigrationban/515670/ [https://perma.cc/QM7X-CZ3X].
108 29 U.S.C. 152(5) (2018) (deﬁning “labor organization”).
109 ”Alt-labor” is an umbrella term for organizations that advocate for workers, but that are not
“labor organizations” as deﬁned by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). For a
discussion of the practical and legal implications of whether or not a worker advocacy group is a
statutory labor organization, see generally Michael C. Duﬀ, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and
Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837 (2014).
110 See generally N.Y.C. TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE, New York Taxi Workers Alliance Mission & History,
http://www.nytwa.org/mission-and-history [https://perma.cc/QT7D-9Y4Z] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019)
(describing NYTWA’s mission).
111 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
112 Id. at 892.
113 Id. at 907 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 294 (1981)).
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tactics—including some picketing in support of secondary consumer
boycotts—and the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld these limitations.114
This means that if the NYTWA had been a bona fide labor organization, it
would have risked being sued for damages,115 and the NLRB’s general counsel
would have been obligated to take rapid steps to attempt to obtain an injunction
against the NYTWA’s strike.116 The same would have been true even if the
NYTWA had changed tactics and—rather than striking—marched in front of
the airport with picket signs calling on would-be passengers to boycott all
flights until the Executive Order was repealed. Ironically, then, labor unions
are barred from engaging in some forms of the very tactics that are probably
most closely associated with them: strikes and picketing.117
The text of the NLRA’s secondary boycott provision, § 8(b)(4), is
notoriously diﬃcult to parse; the NLRB’s website calls it “mind-numbing,”118
and the Supreme Court has lamented that labor law “has created no concept
more elusive than that of ‘secondary’ conduct; it has drawn no lines more
arbitrary, tenuous, and shifting than those separating ‘primary’ from
‘secondary’ activities.”119 However, at bottom, § 8(b)(4) covers labor
organizations’ use of two tactics: ﬁrst, secondary strikes, as well as behavior
that “induce[s] or encourage[s]” the employees of a neutral employer to
strike; and second, other activity that “threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s]
114 See, e.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 227 (1982) (upholding
application of labor law’s prohibition on secondary strikes to a protest of the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan); NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (holding
that the prohibition on secondary activity covers picketing in support of a consumer boycott of a
struck product when the picketing occurs in front of a neutral employer whose business mainly
consists of selling the struck product). Many scholars have highlighted the Supreme Court’s
treatment of labor unions as compared to other types of advocacy groups in First Amendment cases
involving boycotts and picketing. See, e.g., Marion Crain & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1791, 1797-99 (2015) (discussing the connection between the First Amendment’s right
of assembly and contemporary protections for labor unionism); Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United
& Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 17 (2011) (arguing
that Citizens United undermined limits on First Amendment protection applicable to labor-related
speech, such as picketing, boycotting, and striking); James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First
Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984) (exploring
the doctrinal structure underlying restrictions on the First Amendment protections for labor
unions); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free
Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 938 (1982) (arguing that “consumer picketing that does not coerce the
listener is expression entitled to First Amendment protection”).
115 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (2018).
116 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2018).
117 The following discussion focuses mainly on § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, which prohibits certain
secondary striking and picketing. It also brieﬂy discusses § 8(b)(7), which prohibits certain
“recognitional” picketing, which urges an employer to recognize a union as the lawful representative
of its employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2018).
118 Secondary Boycotts (Section 8(b)(4)), NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whatslaw/unions/secondary-boycotts-section-8b4 [https://perma.cc/R63F-4LLN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
119 Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386-87 (1969).
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any [neutral] person engaged in commerce.”120 It then links those tactics to
four prohibited goals: forcing an employer to join a union or promise not to
handle struck goods; forcing any person to stop doing business with anyone
else; forcing an employer to bargain with a union when another union has
already been certiﬁed as the representative of the employer’s employees; and
forcing an employer to assign work to employees belonging to a certain
union.121 (The second of these goals—forcing a person to cease doing business
with someone else122—is the most important for the remainder of this
section.)
Putting together the forbidden tactics with the forbidden goals, unions
may not engage in or even encourage secondary strikes in pursuit of any
prohibited goal; and they may not “threaten, coerce, or restrain” anyone
engaged in commerce in pursuit of the prohibited goals. This means a union
may make a polite request of a manager of a neutral business to stop doing
business with a struck business, but it could not “coerce” the neutral business
into dropping the struck business.123 Activities that would violate the statue
would include bringing a neutral’s employees out on strike, but also picketing
in support of a consumer boycott of the neutral. Finally, the statute includes
three “provisos,” which add the following: ﬁrst, § 8(b)(4) does not reach
primary strikes or picketing; second, workers may refuse to cross primary
picket lines; and third, the statute does not prohibit “publicity, other than
picketing” that advises the public of the existence of a labor dispute in some
circumstances.124
This statutory language leaves much interpretation to the NLRB and the
courts. For example, the key term “coerce” is undeﬁned in the NLRA, so
those bodies must determine when union demands that a neutral employer
stop dealing with a struck employer rises to the level of coercion. Here, it is
apparent from both the statutory language of the picketing proviso and the
legislative history that Congress viewed at least some picketing as inherently
coercive,125 but what qualiﬁes as picketing? And what about activity other
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
Id.
Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1964) (explaining that unions may make
noncoercive appeals to managers to request that they stop doing business with a struck employer);
520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs. v. Unite Here Local 1, 760 F.3d 708, 733 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing
noncoercive appeals to secondary organizations to join the union’s cause).
124 For a useful overview and synthesis of what qualiﬁes as secondary activity, see generally
Lesnick, supra note 7.
125 Section 8(b)(4) refers to picketing only in its provisos, which specify that the section does not
reach “any . . . primary picketing,” or “publicity, other than picketing,” that advises the public about the
existence of a labor dispute. As is discussed below, this might suggest by negative implication that the
statute forbids secondary picketing that advises the public of a labor dispute. Further, the legislative
120
121
122
123
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than picketing, such as the common union tactic of stationing a giant
inﬂatable rat balloon outside a neutral employer’s establishment?126 Further,
given that § 8(b)(4) regulates speech and other expressive activity, does the
First Amendment limit its application? Many of these questions remain
unanswered, or only partially answered, as the next subsection discusses.
2. Labor Picketing, the First Amendment, and Constitutional
Avoidance at the Supreme Court
Constitutional avoidance has played a signiﬁcant role in how the courts
have interpreted the NLRA’s restrictions on union secondary activity. This
subsection describes the role of constitutional avoidance in key Supreme
Court cases and sets up the discussion in the next Part of how avoidance has
shaped the development of labor and First Amendment law.
The Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of § 8(b)(4) and related
statutory provisions in a trio of cases decided in 1951. In one of those cases,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB (Electrical
Workers), a union argued that it had a First Amendment right to picket during a
dispute with a construction subcontractor, even though the picketing had
prompted the employees of another, neutral subcontractor, to strike.127 The
Court rejected that argument with little discussion, suggesting that future First
history of the Taft-Hartley Act reveals that Congress was preoccupied with picketing in particular. See,
e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 44 (1947) (stating that “[t]here obviously is no justification for picketing
a place of business at which no labor dispute exists”).
126 Hassan Kanu, Death to Scabby: Trump Labor Counsel Wants Protest Icon Deflated,
BLOOMBERGLAW (Jan. 22, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/death-to-scabbytrump-labor-counsel-wants-protest-icon-deflated [https://perma.cc/ZE2X-TRCA] (describing a case in
which NLRB attorneys are arguing that deployment of an inflatable rat should be treated as picketing,
or as otherwise coercive, when it is used for a secondary purpose).
127 341 U.S. 694 (1951). The Court’s reasoning—that Congress was free to prohibit unions from
conducting secondary strikes, and so it must also have been free to prohibit or regulate speech
soliciting others to engage in that prohibited activity—was already established in another labor case.
Two years earlier, the Court had upheld an injunction against a union’s picketing of an ice dealer,
where the union was demanding that the dealer commit an antitrust violation by refusing to sell to
non-union peddlers. The Court wrote that “[i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949). And, although the Court has since narrowed the rule from Giboney, it still exists in
modern free speech jurisprudence. See generally Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal
Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2016) (tracing the evolution of “speech integral to
illegal conduct” since Giboney).
However, none of this is to imply that there are no situations in which § 8(b)(4) might violate the
First Amendment, either on its face or when applied to speech that merely encourages neutral employees
to strike. Cf. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 467-68 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019
WL 4889927 (Oct. 4, 2019) (holding that a criminal statute covering any person who “encourages or
induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States” was “overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment”). I am grateful to Jessica Rutter for alerting me to the Sineneng-Smith case.
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Amendment challenges to § 8(b)(4) would be equally fruitless: “The substantive
evil condemned by Congress in § 8(b)(4) is the secondary boycott and we
recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing
in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives.”128 To be clear, the Court’s
reference to “secondary boycotts” actually referred only to secondary strikes, and
not consumer boycotts; when the Court decided Electrical Workers, § 8(b)(4)
covered only secondary strikes, plus expression that encouraged or induced a
secondary strike. It did not yet reach other threatening, coercive, or restraining
behavior, including (some) calls for secondary consumer boycotts. That
consumer-facing conduct was not made an unfair labor practice until § 8(b)(4)
was amended in 1959, and it is this conduct with which many of the other cases
discussed in this subsection have been concerned.129
Electrical Workers was the ﬁrst Supreme Court case to hold that § 8(b)(4)
did not violate the First Amendment. However, constitutional questions
about NLRA restrictions on union speech remained. The Court ﬁrst used
constitutional avoidance to answer one of these questions—construing the
NLRA as it relates to picketing—in the 1960 case, NLRB v. Drivers Local
Union 639 (Drivers).130 The issue in Drivers was whether a union’s peaceful
picketing demanding that an employer recognize the union as its employees’
representative coerced non-union employees in violation of their NLRA right
to engage in or refrain from protected concerted activity.131 Holding that it
did not, Justice Brennan advanced a method of reading the NLRA that was
informed by constitutional concerns. Though he did not use the words “First
Amendment” or “constitutional avoidance” anywhere in the opinion, Justice
Brennan began by observing that unions had a “right” to “use all lawful
propaganda to enlarge their membership.”132 He then described an approach
in which courts would construe § 8(b)(4) narrowly, guided by its legislative
history: “[i]n the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt
explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established ﬂow from such
picketing.”133 Moreover, Justice Brennan noted that although Congress had
Electrical Workers, 341 U.S. at 705.
Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 140–141 (1947)
(codiﬁed at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1959)).
130 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
131 Id. at 275; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (2018) (making it an unfair labor practice for a union
to “restrain or coerce” employees in the exercise of their right to engage in protected concerted
activity). Section 8(b)(7), which places a set of limits on unions’ recognitional picketing, was enacted
after the events giving rise to Drivers occurred.
132 362 U.S. at 279 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 209 (1921)); see also Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First
Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 294-95 (2015) (describing Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Drivers as “an encomium to the long history of constitutional protection of ‘a right in
unions to use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership’”).
133 Drivers, 362 U.S. at 284.
128
129
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prohibited certain strikes and boycotts, it had also explicitly protected
primary strikes.134 These features of the NLRA, Justice Brennan concluded,
meant that courts and the Board should not interfere with peaceful labor
picketing “unless there is the clearest indication in the legislative history” of
congressional desire to outlaw the particular tactic.135
Justice Brennan’s legislative history and constitutional avoidancedriven approach to construing NLRA picketing restrictions soon
reappeared, this time in a § 8(b)(4) case. In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (“Tree Fruits”),136 the Court considered
whether § 8(b)(4) prohibited union picketing in support of a call for
consumers not to buy a specific product (struck Washington state apples)
when shopping at the grocery store, where the union was clear that it was
not calling for a boycott of the store as a whole .137
The NLRB’s view was that even this limited conduct qualiﬁed as
threatening, coercive, or restraining, in violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).138 The
agency’s reasoning was only one paragraph long, and did not discuss why this
was so; instead, the Board seemed to assume that union picketing was
necessarily coercive, and instead considered it necessary to analyze only
whether the union had a prohibited goal.139
Before the Supreme Court, the Board (through Solicitor General Archibald
Cox) made that argument explicit, urging that picketing was inherently
coercive under the Court’s own cases.140 This was a reasonable enough position,
considering that in Hughes v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court had written
that “the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces
consequences, different from other modes of communication.”141 In Hughes, the
Court upheld a state court injunction against picketers calling for a consumer
boycott of a department store that refused to hire African American employees
in numbers that reflected local demographics, reasoning that picketing was
fundamentally different than other modes of communication because it was not

Id. at 281 & n.9.
Id. at 284.
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
Id. at 59-60. The Court treated the sandwich boards, worn by union members at Safeway
stores in Seattle, WA, as pickets. They read “To the Consumer: Non-Union Washington State apples
are being sold at this store. Please do not purchase such apples. Thank you. Teamsters Local 760,
Yakima, Washington.” Id. at 60 n.3.
138 Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 132 N.L.R.B. N1172, N1177-78 (1961).
139 Id. (concluding that “[t]he natural and foreseeable result of such picketing, if successful,
would be to force or require Safeway to reduce or to discontinue altogether its purchases of such
apples from the struck employers”).
140 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 7-8, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen,
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (No. 88), 1963 WL 105942, at *7-8.
141 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
134
135
136
137
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merely an “appeal to reason.”142 Instead, the Court implied, the protestors’
picket line would prompt unthinking responses, whether driven by labor
solidarity, embarrassment, or conflict aversion. Beyond that, the Board’s other
argument at the Supreme Court focused on the language of § 8(b)(4)’s publicity
proviso, which protects “publicity, other than picketing” that advises the public
of a labor dispute.143 It reasoned that the negative implication of that
language—particularly when coupled with the Court’s own view about the
nature of picketing—was that picketing that advised the public of a labor
dispute was prohibited.
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Tree Fruits did not closely track
either of these arguments. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the majority
acknowledged that the union’s conduct likely fell “literally within the
statutory prohibition.”144 However, citing potential First Amendment
concerns, Justice Brennan then applied something approaching a clear
statement rule, seeking speciﬁc conﬁrmation from the relevant legislative
history that Congress intended § 8(b)(4) to reach product-speciﬁc picketing
in support of a consumer boycott.145 The majority suggested this approach
had been directed by Congress—here, the Court quoted the “isolated evils”
language from Drivers—reasoning that “[b]oth the congressional policy [of
targeting picketing restrictions narrowly] and our adherence to this principle
of interpretation reﬂect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing
might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment.”146 Then, upon
ﬁnding that the legislative history was silent or ambiguous, the Court held
that picketing in support of a consumer boycott of a struck product was not
categorically prohibited.147
The Court’s focus on legislative history meant that it did not revisit
Hughes’s approach to analyzing First Amendment protections for picketing,
and its opinion gave no hint whether Congress could choose to outlaw
picketing in support of a product boycott. In fact, the majority opinion hardly
discussed the First Amendment at all, beyond observing that constitutional
questions existed in the case.148 This fact stands out when one considers the
other opinions in the case: a concurrence by Justice Black concluding that the
union’s conduct did violate the statute, but that the statute violated the First
Amendment; and a dissent by Justice Harlan concluding both that the union’s
Id. at 468.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellants, supra note 140, at *8-9.
NLRB v. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964).
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 63 (suggesting a “broad ban against peaceful picketing” may conﬂict with First
Amendment guarantees).
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
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conduct violated the statute, and that the statute was constitutional based on
the Court’s previous decisions upholding restrictions on picketing.
The Tree Fruits Court did not say union picketing in support of a struck
product boycott could never qualify as coercive—indeed, the question of how
to assess whether union conduct coerced a neutral business received little
attention at all in light of the Court’s legislative history-driven approach. But,
nearly ﬁfteen years later, that issue reached the Court in NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001 (“Safeco”).149 Safeco involved a fact pattern that
was very similar to Tree Fruits, except that whereas the struck apples in Tree
Fruits constituted a tiny fraction of Safeway’s business, the struck product in
Safeco (Safeco title insurance policies) constituted “substantially all” of the
business of one of the picketed title companies.150
This time, the majority did not look for a clear indication in the legislative
history that Congress intended to reach this type of picketing. Instead, it
focused on the potential harm to the neutral employer, reasoning that
“[p]roduct picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral
parties with ruin or substantial loss simply does not square with the language
or the purpose” of § 8(b)(4).151 This conclusion required the Court to confront
the First Amendment question directly, resulting in agreement by six Justices
that the statute did not violate the First Amendment, but without a
controlling opinion.
Justice Powell’s opinion involved avoidance creep, but not in the same way
that Abood did. Writing for himself and three justices, Justice Powell relied
primarily on Tree Fruits, claiming that it “left no doubt that Congress may
prohibit secondary picketing calculated ‘to persuade the customers of the
secondary employer to cease trading with him . . . .’”152 (He also cited Electrical
Workers, which, as discussed above, concerned picketing related to a secondary
strike rather than a consumer boycott, and two cases upholding picketing
restrictions based on the reasoning that picketing was fundamentally different
from other forms of expression.153) But, of course, Justice Powell’s reading of
Tree Fruits was wrong: that case did not hold that § 8(b)(4) was consistent with
the First Amendment; instead, it bracketed that question by reading the
statute not to cover certain consumer-facing picketing.
Justice Blackmun concurred, writing that he was “reluctant to hold
unconstitutional Congress’ striking of the delicate balance” between union

447 U.S. 607 (1980).
Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 614-15.
Id. at 616 (citing Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63).
Id. (citing Am. Radio Ass’n v. Mobile S.S. Ass’n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-31 (1974); Teamsters v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957)).
149
150
151
152
153
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expression and neutral employers.154 And Justice Stevens gave a full-throated
defense of the Hughes view of picketing, writing that “[t]he statutory ban in
this case aﬀects only that aspect of the union’s eﬀorts to communicate its
views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned
response to an idea.”155
After Tree Fruits and Safeco, unions may picket a neutral company in
support of a consumer boycott of a struck product—but only if the product
doesn’t comprise too large an amount of the neutral’s business. What qualiﬁes
as too large is unclear—the answer falls somewhere between “a de minimis
amount” and “substantially all.”156
The Tree Fruits/Safeco rule is speciﬁc to picketing, but several years after
Safeco, the Supreme Court decided a case about handbilling; again,
constitutional avoidance was key to the outcome. In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council,157 the Court
considered whether § 8(b)(4) prohibited a building trades union from
distributing handbills to mall customers asking them to boycott the entire
mall in reaction to a department store’s decision to employ non-union
contractors. In addition, the handbills made a case for why consumers should
boycott: the contractor paid sub-standard wages, and this failure to adhere to
area standards would ultimately hurt the community as a whole by driving
down wages and purchasing power.158
Thus, the question was whether this consumer handbilling coerced or
restrained the mall or its tenants, who would in turn be forced to pressure the
department store to ﬁre the non-union contractor. Two years after Claiborne
Hardware, the NLRB held that “the statute’s literal language and the
applicable case law require that we ﬁnd a violation,” because calls for
secondary consumer boycotts “constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are
therefore a form of coercion.”159 The agency refused to consider the union’s
First Amendment defense (and apparently did not view the First
Amendment as a reason to construe the statute narrowly) because “as a
Id. at 617 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The diﬃculty of applying Tree Fruits and Safeco is illustrated by cases involving the “merged
product rule.” For example, when a union picketed a restaurant that sold struck bread, the NLRB
concluded that the picketing fell on the Safeco side of the line because the bread “had become so
integrated into the food served that to cease purchasing [it] would almost amount to customers
stopping all trade with the secondary employer.” Am. Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154 (6th Cir.
1969); see also Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying enforcement to
Board decision that the union was covered by the Tree Fruits exception when it asked grocery store
customers to refrain from using struck paper bags, because “[w]e are also unable to ﬁnd evidence in
the record that any other meaningful alternatives to paper bags exist”).
157 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
158 Id. at 570-71.
159 Fla. Bldg. Trades Council, 273 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432 & n.6 (1985).
154
155
156
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congressionally created administrative agency, we will presume the
constitutionality of the Act we administer.”160
The Supreme Court reversed the Board. It began by observing that a
(potential) prohibition on handbilling raises First Amendment concerns: “Had
the union simply been leafleting the public generally . . . there is little doubt
that the legislative proscription of such leaflets would pose a substantial issue
of validity under the First Amendment.”161 Although more substantial than the
discussion in Tree Fruits, the Court’s discussion of the First Amendment issues
in the case was still quite circumscribed. In fact, it was limited to about oneand-one-half paragraphs, the bulk of which went as follows:
That a labor union is the leaﬂetter and that a labor dispute was involved does
not foreclose this [First Amendment] analysis. We do not suggest that
communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety
and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The
handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial
speech such as advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits, for
they pressed the beneﬁts of unionism to the community and the dangers of
inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace.
Of course, commercial speech itself is protected by the First
Amendment . . . however these handbills are to be classiﬁed, the Court of
Appeals was plainly correct in holding that the Board’s construction would
require deciding serious constitutional issues.162

Reading that paragraph, one would be left with, at minimum, the
following questions. First, are there any situations where the fact that a labor
union is the speaker makes a diﬀerence to the First Amendment analysis?
Second, if so, what are they, and in which direction does the diﬀerence run?
Third, when, if ever, is union speech commercial speech? Fourth, is an “area
standards” campaign atypical commercial speech, political speech, or
something else entirely? Fifth, if something else, then what, and does that
category receive greater or lesser protection than typical commercial speech?
The DeBartolo Court oﬀered no answers. Instead, it pivoted to statutory
analysis: “we must independently inquire whether there is another
interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns.”163 One of
the most important words in that sentence turns out to be “independently”—
as a result of its decision to apply constitutional avoidance, the Court
dispensed with Chevron deference, which it acknowledged would ordinarily
160
161
162
163

Id. at 1432.
DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 576.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
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apply.164 (As is discussed in more detail below, the principle that
constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron is a major legacy of DeBartolo.)
Having decided to interpret 8(b)(4) de novo, the Court again cited NLRB
v. Drivers for the proposition that the “clearest indication in the legislative
history” was required to adopt a reading of § 8(b)(4) that would raise
constitutional questions.165 Not ﬁnding any such indication, the Court
concluded that the “section is open to a construction that obviates deciding
whether a congressional prohibition of handbilling on the facts of this case
would violate the First Amendment.”166
DeBartolo is the Supreme Court’s most recent word on the scope of
§ 8(b)(4). The next Part explains how DeBartolo, along with Tree Fruits and
Safeco, eﬀectively maintain what are likely unconstitutional limits on unions’
rights to protest.
III. THE HARMS OF AVOIDANCE CREEP IN LABOR LAW
This Part draws on the labor law examples from Part II to demonstrate
that, in many instances, constitutional avoidance not only fails to work as
advertised, but has the opposite of its intended eﬀect. Constitutional
avoidance is supposed to protect constitutional rights and norms, promote
reasoned development of law in Congress, agencies, and the courts, and
preserve congressional authority. But sometimes it degrades constitutional
rights, stymies the development of law, and eﬀectively erodes congressional
and agency authority.
This Part begins by discussing the real-world consequences of
constitutional avoidance for both labor law and constitutional law and then
closes by discussing the extent to which the avoidance decisions discussed in
the previous Part comport either with Congress’s expectations or desires, or
with the alternative accounts of constitutional avoidance discussed in Part I.
A. Constitutional Avoidance’s Eﬀects on Labor Law
The previous Part showed how the law of union fees and the law of
secondary activity each reﬂect avoidance creep; this Section discusses some
practical consequences of that creep for labor unions, and doctrinal
consequences for labor law.
In the context of private sector union dues and fees, the avoidance creep
story is straightforward: if not for the Court’s holding in Street, the Court

164
165
166

Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 577 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960)).
Id. at 577-78.
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almost certainly would not have decided Beck as it did.167 And it is at least
possible (though not certain) that the outcome in Abood and later public
sector union dues cases also would have been diﬀerent without Street; at
minimum, Abood’s reasoning would have been diﬀerent. For example, even if
the Abood Court had still decided that compelled subsidization of speech by
a private entity implicates the First Amendment, it presumably would have
oﬀered a more thorough explanation for that conclusion if it had not relied
so heavily on Street.
That means even if we set aside the public sector, avoidance has had some
eﬀect on union operations. Unions get most of their revenue from dues, but
Beck means that represented workers can be required to pay only the costs of
union representation, and not the union’s other activities. As a result, some
unions engage in costly “internal organizing” to convince represented workers
that they should voluntarily pay more than is required, and support union
activities such as organizing new workplaces and engaging in the political
arena.168 Likewise, unions must implement a set of detailed procedures
designed to ensure that represented workers’ fees are not used for
impermissible purposes.169
Perhaps these results are desirable from a policy perspective. For example,
some union supporters lauded as necessary to revitalizing the labor
movement the “internal organizing” that public sector unions undertook in
the lead-up to the Supreme Court’s Janus decision.170 Although not
celebrating Janus itself, these commentators saw Janus as the impetus for
unions to do something that they should have been doing all along—but that
some neglected while represented workers could be required to pay agency
fees. Still, it is likely that an eﬀect of Beck was to decrease private sector
unions’ political muscle, with consequences for both unions themselves and
the political landscape.171
Supra subsection II.A.2.
See United Nurses and Allied Prof ’ls (Kent Hosp.), 367 N.L.R.B. No. 94, at 1 (2019)
(holding that represented workers could not be required to pay for union lobbying on bills related
to represented workers’ working conditions).
169 See Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 (1995) (holding that unions must
provide represented workers with information about how agency fees were calculated and what
activities they fund, and a process to challenge that calculation).
170 E.g., Gabriel Winant, Will ‘Janus’ Prove to Be the Fatal Blow That Unions Have Long Feared?,
THE NATION (June 27, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/will-janus-prove-fatal-blowunions-long-feared/ [https://perma.cc/6LCB-AZ9D].
171 It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate about exactly how the country would be different
if private sector unions could require represented workers to pay full dues. But research by a trio of
political scientists shows that an effect of right-to-work laws (which prohibit unions from collecting any
dues or fees) depress the vote for Democratic Party candidates in presidential elections. See James
Feigenbaum, Alex Hertel-Fernandez & Vanessa Williamson, From the Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box:
Political Effects of Right to Work Laws (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24259, 2018),
167
168
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The story about secondary activity is more complicated, and requires
teasing apart separate aspects of the Court’s use of avoidance. One might
assume there is little daylight between an outcome that rests on avoidance,
and an outcome that rests on the Constitution in cases like Tree Fruits and
DeBartolo. Particularly for readers who prefer the outcomes in those cases,
perhaps the Court’s use of avoidance will seem like a neutral-to-positive
development. That reasoning has some force—but a more complete picture
suggests that avoidance creep stemming from these decisions has prevented
labor law from keeping pace with either developing First Amendment law or
the on-the-ground reality of union picketing and other secondary activity.
Unlike the next subsection, which discusses how constitutional law might
have developed diﬀerently if not for the Court’s reliance on avoidance, this
Part mostly avoids counterfactuals and tries to isolate the real-world
consequences of the Supreme Court’s use of avoidance in Tree Fruits and
DeBartolo. Those consequences come from two aspects of avoidance: ﬁrst,
avoidance decisions are usually sparsely explained; and second, avoidance
displaces the deference that courts would usually give agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutory terms. The result is a worst-of-both-worlds scenario
in which the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s decisions are left undeﬁned,
but the NLRB’s ability to respond to real world developments while
interpreting and applying § 8(b)(4) is also limited. In practical terms, this
means a patchwork of decisions that focus on interpreting what the Supreme
Court meant in DeBartolo and other cases, rather than on more fundamental
questions about whether secondary activity really “coerces” listeners,
sometimes to the detriment of union speakers.
1. Avoidance Decisions in the Courts
As subsection II.B.2 discussed, the decisions in Tree Fruits and DeBartolo
were narrow; they did not announce broadly applicable principles for
deciding secondary activity cases. The Court’s explanations of the outcomes
in the two cases were also minimal. The latter is in part because of the nature
of constitutional avoidance. At least under the traditional account of
avoidance, it is a virtue for a court to give only a brief—one might say
cursory—account of the avoided constitutional questions. Say too much, and
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24259 [https://perma.cc/BF9B-6WK4]; see also James Feigenbaum,
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Vanessa Williamson, Right-to-Work Laws Have Devastated Unions—and
Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/conor-lambunions-pennsylvania.html [https://perma.cc/VG6T-AZ6T] (noting that “[w]e have quantified the
electoral effects of one kind of anti-union law, commonly called ‘right to work’ legislation . . . . The results
[of the bills] are ugly for Democrats and for the working class.”). It stands to reason that reducing the
amount of fees that unions can require represented workers to pay would have a similar effect, though
likely to a smaller magnitude.
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the Court will have defeated the stated purposes of avoidance and maybe even
verged into advisory opinion territory.172 But saying too little means
avoidance decisions will be underdetermined, leaving more than the usual
level of uncertainty about how they will apply in future cases.
There are two ways that courts might over-read avoidance decisions. In the
first situation, a later court takes the fact that an earlier court avoided a
constitutional question as an indication that a statute at issue is, in fact,
unconstitutional. That is similar to what happened in the union dues context;
it has also happened outside of labor law, and scholars have criticized the Court
for using avoidance to bootstrap its way to a constitutional holding striking
down a disfavored statute. The leading example here involves § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, which required certain jurisdictions to “preclear” changes to their
voting practices. First, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One
v. Holder,173 the Court engaged in “cursory analysis” to conclude that
constitutional questions called for a narrow interpretation of the statute.174
Then, in Shelby County v. Holder,175 the Court relied on the constitutional
analysis from Northwest Austin to strike down § 5—treating Northwest Austin as
having resolved constitutional questions instead of just raising them.176
But courts can also over-read avoidance decisions in the opposite way—
by treating an avoided question as evidence that the underlying statute is
constitutional. This is what happened in Safeco, when Justice Powell cited Tree
Fruits for the proposition that 8(b)(4) is constitutional.177 And this example
is not isolated; circuit courts have made the same mistake by treating
DeBartolo as dispositive that 8(b)(4) is constitutional as applied to secondary
activity other than handbilling.178 These decisions treat Tree Fruits and
172 See Fish, supra note 2, at 1283 (stating that the “principal justiﬁcation for the shift to modern
avoidance was that it prevents a court from issuing advisory opinions”).
173 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
174 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 12, at 2133.
175 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
176 Id. at 2135 (writing that in Shelby County, the Court’s reasoning from Northwest Austin
reached “full ﬂower”); see also Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 722-23 (2014) (noting that “[t]he structure of the Shelby County
majority opinion mirrors the constitutional portion of the [Northwest Austin] decision, in essence,
treating [Northwest Austin] as though it oﬀered binding holdings on the constitutional questions
rather than merely raising the constitutional doubts about the statute for purposes of applying the
avoidance canon.”).
177 NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980).
178 See, e.g., Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.
2005) (“DeBartolo reaﬃrmed longstanding Supreme Court precedent that the Board can regulate
union secondary picketing under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) without implicating the First
Amendment.”); Warshawsky & Co. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 948, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The obvious
implication of DeBartolo, consistent with the Court’s prior precedent, is that an appeal limited to
employees of a neutral employer which reasonably could be found to be an inducement to engage in
a secondary strike is quite another matter; it does not raise any constitutional problems.”).
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DeBartolo as though they delineate the full scope of the constitutional
protection for secondary activity, rather than holding that § 8(b)(4) does not
cover at least some factual scenarios.
Additionally, DeBartolo stands for the proposition that constitutional
avoidance displaces Chevron deference because agencies do not have
particular expertise in constitutional interpretation.179 (For the same reason,
courts do not defer to agencies’ interpretation or application of court
decisions, even when those decisions concern a statute the agency
administers.180) In other words, where ambiguous statutory language
implicates constitutional questions—such as whether particular union
conduct is “coercive” under the statute—courts need not defer to agency
expertise in interpreting that language. This leads to troubling consequences
in the § 8(b)(4) context: to the extent the statutory language is not
unconstitutional, it calls out for expert interpretation in light of changing
circumstances.181 But courts will often review the Board’s § 8(b)(4) decisions
de novo because they could implicate constitutional questions—which, as the
following paragraphs detail, can give the NLRB an incentive to decide
§ 8(b)(4) cases using methods of statutory interpretation that are familiar to
courts rather than applying substantive expertise.
To see how this cycle arises, consider two circuit court decisions arising
out of the same union activity: staging a mock funeral procession outside a
hospital, accompanied by union handbilling, which the hospital argued (and
the NLRB agreed) violated § 8(b)(4).182 The hospital was a secondary target;
the primaries were two companies that used non-union labor for a
construction project at the hospital.183 A district court temporarily enjoined
the union’s activity, and the union appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.184
Arguing against the injunction, the union relied in part on DeBartolo to argue
that the injunction should be reversed if the court thought that continuing it
might violate the union’s First Amendment rights.185

179 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 574-75 (1988).
180 E.g., Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2002) (holding that the NLRB is
not entitled to deference where “[t]he application of Catholic Bishop to the facts of th[e] case is thus
an interpretation of precedent, rather than a statute”).
181 A study by Professor James J. Brudney reﬂects that courts frequently overturn NLRB
decisions despite Chevron. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy
Together, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498 (2014). This ﬁnding suggests that constitutional avoidance
is not the only obstacle to judicial deference to NLRB decisions.
182 Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261-62.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1264.
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From the perspective of contemporary First Amendment law, the union’s
argument had considerable force. After all, the injunction was a prior restraint
against protest activity taking place on a public sidewalk, in compliance with
state and local law; moreover, § 8(b)(4) is in relevant part content, speaker,
and even viewpoint discriminatory. And the union’s activities were peaceful;
as the D.C. Circuit noted during the next stage of the litigation, the protestors
did not even jaywalk.186 In other words, the argument that it would be
unconstitutional to treat the union’s conduct as an unfair labor practice is as
near a slam-dunk as any First Amendment argument could be. Yet, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction—and it did so mainly based on
DeBartolo.187 The Eleventh Circuit took the fact that DeBartolo “carefully
distinguished peaceful expressive handbilling from picketing and patrolling”
as an indication that the decision “reaﬃrmed longstanding Supreme Court
precedent that the Board can regulate union secondary picketing” under
§ 8(b)(4).188 Then, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the mock funeral was
similar to “picketing and patrolling,” basing that conclusion entirely on
reasoning by analogy to DeBartolo, rather than on any empirical analysis of
the attributes or eﬀects of picketing as compared to mock funerals.189 Thus,
for the Eleventh Circuit, the injunction not only did not violate the union’s
First Amendment rights, it did not even raise constitutional questions to be
avoided.190
Later, the NLRB concluded the mock funeral did violate § 8(b)(4),
employing similar reasoning to the Eleventh Circuit to ﬁnd that the mock
funeral was tantamount to coercive picketing,191 and the union appealed to
the DC Circuit.192 This time, the union succeeded, largely because the court
went beyond DeBartolo to consider other First Amendment caselaw. First, the
court (correctly) observed that neither Safeco nor DeBartolo addressed street
theater, which the court thought was “neither picketing nor handbilling but
has elements of each.”193 Crucially, the court then turned to whether the mock
funeral was “coercive,”194 writing “[t]hat question must be answered
consistent with developments in the Supreme Court’s [F]irst [A]mendment
jurisprudence.”195 As one would expect, once the Court juxtaposed the union’s
orderly mock funeral with abortion clinic protests, or the Westboro Baptist
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1264-67.
Id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1265.
Id.
Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 206-07 (2006).
Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id.
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Church’s anti-gay picketing at military funerals, it concluded that “nothing
[the union] did can realistically be deemed coercive, threatening, restraining,
or intimidating as those terms are ordinarily understood—quite apart, that is,
from any special understanding necessary to avoid infringing upon the Union
members’ right of free speech.”196
The diﬀerence between the two courts’ approaches is key. The Eleventh
Circuit overread DeBartolo as an aﬃrmation that a ban on picketing and other
union secondary activity (aside from handbilling) was consistent with the
First Amendment. Therefore, the main question was whether a mock funeral
qualiﬁed as picketing; if it did, then the court was at the end of its analysis
and the union violated § 8(b)(4). But the DC Circuit correctly saw DeBartolo
as reﬂecting the obvious proposition that § 8(b)(4) is in tension with the First
Amendment. Accordingly, its analysis centered the application of modern
First Amendment cases to the union’s street theater.
Finally, it is telling that judges addressing the regulation of inﬂatable rats
or banners outside of the § 8(b)(4) context—unencumbered by DeBartolo and
the rest of the Court’s § 8(b)(4) decisions—seem to ﬁnd the issue far more
straightforward than either the Kentov or the Sheet Metal Workers courts. For
example, Judge Posner recently wrote that “[t]here is no doubt that the large
inﬂated rubber rats widely used by labor unions to dramatize their struggles
with employers are forms of expression protected by the First
Amendment.”197 Then, he continued: “The rats are the traditional union
picketers’ signs writ large.”198 But for Judge Posner, the analogy between
picket signs and rats was—rightly—a reason to ﬁnd that application of a
municipal sign code to Scabby the rat was inconsistent with the First
Amendment, whereas the opposite is true in the NLRB context—in part
because of Justice Powell’s reading of Tree Fruits in Safeco. The Sixth Circuit
easily reached the same conclusion in a similar case involving application of
another sign code to another rat balloon.199
None of this is meant to suggest that courts always overread avoidance
decisions—the DC Circuit’s careful handling of DeBartolo in Sheet Metal
Workers is proof to the contrary. But there are enough examples in which
courts do overread avoidance decisions that we should ask why. One likely
culprit is mentioned above—courts that base their rulings on avoidance tend
to write short opinions that are light on explanation. Later lawyers, agencies,
and judges attempting to interpret and apply these decisions will be able to

Id. at 439.
Constr. & Gen. Laborers’ Local Union No. 33 v. Town of Grand Chute, 834 F.3d 745, 751
(7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting).
198 Id.
199 Tucker v. City of Fairﬁeld, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005).
196
197
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wring a range of conﬂicting principles from them, resulting in a pro-union
speech opinion like DeBartolo being deployed to restrict union speech in later
cases. One result—discussed further in Part III.C—is that even if avoidance
decisions themselves are meant to preserve courts’ reputations or legitimacy,
their deployment in later cases can seem capricious or results-oriented.
2. Avoidance Decisions at the NLRB
The same set of diﬃculties can arise when the NLRB attempts to apply
avoidance decisions, but with the added wrinkle that avoidance limits the
Board’s ability to interpret and apply ambiguous terms in the NLRA in light
of changing circumstances, as it otherwise would do.200 Recently, the NLRB
has decided a handful of cases involving secondary union activity other than
picketing, such as posting large stationary banners and inﬂatable rats. Again,
DeBartolo plays a signiﬁcant and unexpected role.
The NLRB is famous for policy oscillation, and majority-Democratic
boards tend to interpret § 8(b)(4) narrowly, whereas majority-Republican
boards interpret it more broadly. But Democratic and Republican Board
members are united in their view that their respective understandings of
§ 8(b)(4) are required by DeBartolo, along with Tree Fruits and Safeco.
For example, consider a handful of decisions by the NLRB during the
Obama administration about the use of stationary banners and large inﬂatable
rats in secondary protests. First, in a case known as Eliason & Knuth, the
Board considered a union’s placement of large stationary banners on public
sidewalks, close to employers that had hired a struck construction company.201
The employers argued that the banners qualiﬁed as “coercive” under
§ 8(b)(4), either because they constituted “pickets” that did not fall under the
Tree Fruits exception, or because they were phrased in a manner that would
lead the public to conclude (wrongly) that the union had a primary labor
dispute with the secondary companies.202
200 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that where statutory language is unclear, courts should accept reasonable agency
constructions); Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking
in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 213-14 (2009) (“Congress’ implicit
delegation of lawmaking power through the use of ambiguous statutory language . . . requires the
Board to make policy decisions, and in doing so to consider the impact on actual labor relations.”).
201 United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506 (“Eliason & Knuth”), 355 N.L.R.B. 797,
798-99 (2010). These banners did not block the sidewalks on which they were stationed, and they
displayed sentiments such as “SHAME ON [secondary employer]” and “Labor dispute.” Id. at 798
(alteration in original). Another banner asked the public not to patronize one of the secondary
employers. Alongside the banners, the union gave out handbills that contained more detailed
information about the labor dispute, and an appeal to the public arguing that the secondary
companies were undermining area labor standards by hiring the construction companies.
202 Id. at 799.
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The Board rejected these arguments in a 3-2 decision that itself relied in
part on constitutional avoidance, concluding that the banners were neither
pickets nor coercive.203 The Board discussed DeBartolo, and also considered
post-DeBartolo First Amendment cases such as Virginia v. Black204 in concluding
that union members holding a banner are engaged in “actual speech or, at the
very least, symbolic or expressive conduct,” meaning that the same conditions
that triggered avoidance in DeBartolo were present in Eliason & Knuth.205
Accordingly, the Board stated that it was possible—and therefore desirable—to
read § 8(b)(4) to permit secondary consumer-facing banners because they do
not necessarily “threaten, coerce, or restrain” anyone.206
For their part, the two dissenting Board members articulated a very
narrow vision of either statutory or First Amendment protection for
secondary union speech, reasoning that the diﬀerences between picketing and
bannering were “legally insigniﬁcant,” in part because the banner in question
was not very informative.207 They discounted the relevance of First
Amendment cases arising outside of the labor context, reasoning that the
Court had authorized economic regulation that entailed “some constraints on
First Amendment freedoms.”208 DeBartolo, the dissent declared, did not “even
hint[] that the Supreme Court intended to change the Board’s longstanding
and ﬂexible deﬁnition of picketing.”209
After Eliason & Knuth, the Board considered a series of other cases
involving secondary protest tactics; many of these cases also involved banners,
but a couple of them had aspects that required the Board to go beyond Eliason
& Knuth.210 In a case known as Brandon II,211 the Board dismissed a § 8(b)(4)
Id. at 801-811.
538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (holding that the burning of a cross is “symbolic expression” that
could nonetheless be banned as a particularly threatening form of intimidation).
205 Eliason & Knuth, 355 N.L.R.B. at 808-09.
206 Id. at 810.
207 The Court noted that
203
204

Clearly, both bannering and picketing involve elements of speech. However, the
expressive element represented by the brief, obtuse, and misleading written message
on a union banner—such as ‘Don’t Eat RA Sushi’ in one of the cases before us—is less
than the expressive element in picket signs, usually accompanied by vocal protests,
and it is certainly less than in handbills.
Id. at 821.
208 Id. at 820.
209 Id. at 818.
210 See, e.g., Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 357 N.L.R.B. 415, 416-20 (2011)
(ﬁnding that, although a labor organization and a union member described an activity as “picketing,”
and although the banners at issue were closer to the entrance of the employers, the activity was not
unlawful picketing).
211 Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 15, 356 N.L.R.B. 1290 (2011). This case involved
another aspect of the same union activity that gave rise to the Kentov decision in the Eleventh Circuit
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charge involving two tactics: the placement of a 16-foot tall inﬂatable rat
balloon near a hospital that had hired a struck construction company; and the
posting of a union member, holding at arms length a leaﬂet that explained
the labor dispute, near the hospital’s vehicle entrance.212
Reprising its approach from Eliason & Knuth, the Board first observed that
neither the rat nor the leaflet display involved coercive violence or disruption.
Accordingly, the Board went on to consider whether the rat or the display
nonetheless constituted “picketing,” concluding that they did not.213 Then, the
rat and banner display cleared the final hurdle when the Board concluded that
the union’s activity could not have directly caused or been expected to directly
cause “disruption of the secondary’s operations.”214 The Board also observed
that its conclusion was “strongly supported by application of the ‘constitutional
avoidance’ doctrine,”215 particularly in light of the Court’s then-recent decision
in Snyder v. Phelps.216 Again, the two Republican Board members dissented.217
The Board’s holdings in these and other cases218 that stationary banners,
inﬂatable rats, and variations on handbilling are not “coercive” should be
obvious and non-controversial. Yet each of the NLRB cases described above
drew a dissent. Further, it appears that the NLRB under the Trump
administration is beginning to crack down on union secondary picketing and
other protest, and may soon reverse Eliason & Knuth and Brandon II.
In August 2019, the Trump NLRB decided Preferred Building Services
Inc.,219 a case about union picketing outside a San Francisco oﬃce building.
The union’s primary dispute was with a subcontractor hired to clean oﬃce
space in the building; several cleaners working for the company alleged that
they had been sexually harassed by their supervisor, that the company violated
the city’s paid sick leave law, and that they were underpaid.
and the Sheet Metal Workers decision in the DC Circuit. Neither those cases, nor the underlying
Board decisions that they reviewed, addressed the issues that the Brandon II Board decided.
212 Id. at 1290.
213 Id. at 1292 (relying on the fact that neither tactic involved confrontation; they “were
stationary and located at suﬃcient distances from the vehicle and building entrances to the hospital
that visitors were not confronted by an actual or symbolic barrier as they arrived at, or departed
from, the hospital,” and they did not “physically or verbally accost[] hospital patrons”).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1293.
216 Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)).
217 The dissent in Brandon II saw the inﬂatable rat diﬀerently, stating without citation that
“[f]or pedestrians or occupants of cars passing in the shadow of a rat balloon . . . the message is
unmistakably confrontational and coercive.” Id. at 1296. Likewise, the union member holding out a
leaﬂet also “plainly was picketing.” Id. at 1297.
218 See, e.g., Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 356 N.L.R.B. 613, 614 (2011) (holding that a
union banner did not violate § 8(b)(4)’s prohibition on “induc[ing] or encourage[ing]” a secondary
strike where the only evidence in support of the charge was that the union posted banners and
distributed handbills that would be seen by employees of the secondary employer).
219 366 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (2018).
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Labor law allows union picketing of a primary employer while it is
operating on the premises of another employer, but only if the union meets
certain conditions.220 This means that the union’s picketing of the cleaning
company while it was at the oﬃce building would have been allowed as long
as the union took certain steps to immunize the building and its tenants from
the eﬀects of the picketing, including that the union clearly state on its picket
signs that its dispute was with only the cleaning company, and the picketing
was otherwise non-coercive.221 The NLRB held that the union’s picketing fell
short of meeting these requirements: although its picket signs clearly
indicated that the dispute was with the cleaning company, its leaﬂets
“requested that [a building tenant] ensure that ‘their’ janitors obtain better
working conditions.”222 Further, and as a separate basis to ﬁnd that the union
had engaged in unlawful secondary activity, the Board relied on the fact that
the union told a building manager that it would “keep showing up [on the
picket line]” until the manager inﬂuenced the cleaning company to raise
wages.223 The First Amendment did not appear at all in the opinion—but the
Board cited DeBartolo for the proposition that the union’s picketing violated
§ 8(b)(4).224 This case is currently pending on appeal before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.225
And the Board may go further. Reportedly at the NLRB General
Counsel’s direction,226 an NLRB lawyer recently sought to enjoin a union
from deploying an inﬂatable rat against a secondary employer.227 In the reply
brief in support of the injunction, the regional director stated bluntly that
“First Amendment concerns are not implicated, inasmuch as it is settled law
that the First Amendment does not shield unlawful secondary picketing”—
and cited DeBartolo and Safeco.228 In addition, the regional director relied on
DeBartolo to distinguish picketing from other forms of protest.229
In one respect, these cases are illustrative of the NLRB’s more general
approach in § 8(b)(4) cases. As Professor Michael Oswalt put it, “instead of
220 Sailors’ Union of the Paciﬁc, 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 548 (1950). The conditions described in this
case are generally known as the “Moore Dry Dock” requirements.
221 Id. at 549.
222 Preferred Bldg. Servs., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 159 at *5.
223 Id. at *2.
224 Id. at *6 n.20.
225 Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. NLRB, No. 19-70334 (9th Cir. ﬁled Feb. 7, 2019). I am co-author
of an amicus brief arguing that the Ninth Circuit should reverse the NLRB’s decision.
226 Kanu, supra note 126 (quoting a NLRB oﬃcial as stating that the Board’s General Counsel
“hates the rat,” and “wants to ﬁnd it unlawful to picket, strike or handbill with the rat present”).
227 Petition for Preliminary Injunction Under Section 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act
at 6, Ohr v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, No. 1:18-cv-08414 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2018).
228 Reply in Further Support of Petition for Preliminary Injunction Under Section 10(l) of the
National Labor Relations Act at 10, Ohr, (No. 1:18-cv-08414).
229 Id. at 8.
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measuring the coerciveness of a protest directly, analysis often centers on
where conduct falls along a continuum from picketing (coercive), to ‘the
functional equivalent of picketing’ (also coercive), to hand-billing . . . .”230
That is, the Board and the courts often try to group cases into DeBartolo or
not-DeBartolo, but this is a diﬀerent question than whether the statutory
language of § 8(b)(4) covers particular union activity, or whether regulation
of that union activity is foreclosed by the First Amendment.231
Consider the following thought experiment: Imagine an alternate
universe in which § 8(b)(4) was not thought to raise constitutional questions
at all, and Supreme Court cases narrowing its application did not exist. In
that scenario, the NLRB would still have to decide what union activity was
encompassed within vague statutory terms like “coerce” or “encourage.” It is
possible that the NLRB’s approach would still have the “I know it when I see
it” ring to it that it does today.232 But then again, the agency deference
framework developed in Chevron and other cases encourages agencies to
develop and deploy substantive expertise to deﬁne the scope of vague
terms.233 It is at least possible that the Board would have developed useful,
evidence-based standards based on evolving social psychology to distinguish
coercive from non-coercive labor protest,234 and that courts would then have
deferred to the Board’s standards.235
Importantly, those standards could also account for changed social
circumstances. It may have been the case in 1947 or 1959 that some union
secondary activity would make target businesses or passersby afraid for their
safety, but today’s picket lines (and arguable picket-line equivalents) are nearly
always calm affairs. Moreover, as Professor Catherine Fisk has explained,
Congress might reasonably have viewed unions’ calls for secondary strikes as

Michael M. Oswalt, The Content of Coercion, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1585, 1615-16 (2019).
For example, the informational portion of the NLRB’s website informs readers that “[m]ere
handbilling, without more, is not ‘picketing.’” This principle is of course traceable to DeBartolo. The NLRB
then continues: “handbilling may constitute ‘picketing’ under certain circumstances.” Recognitional Picketing
(Section 8(b)(7)), NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/unions/recognitional-picketingsection-8b7 [https://perma.cc/7SN4-CQGA] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
232 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (indicating that
courts had used an “I know it when I see it” approach).
233 See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2095 (1990) (discussing the importance of agency expertise in interpreting statutes); see also Note,
The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1563 (2007) (ﬁnding that “in the circuit courts,
[agency] expertise plays a more central role in the deference decision”).
234 For example, in The Content of Coercion, Professor Oswalt argues that modern emotion
science suggests that coercion occurs when people feel both fear and a lack of control, and that these
concepts are measurable and amenable to an objective analysis. Oswalt, supra note 230, at 1590.
235 But see Brudney, supra note 181, at 498 (ﬁnding, based on empirical analysis, that in NLRB
cases, “[t]he Court’s reliance on agency deference in comparison to other interpretive resources is
no greater since 1984 than it was before Chevron”).
230
231
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coercive when it was true that “[c]rossing a picket line could result in a worker
losing union membership and, consequently, the ability to work in a densely
unionized industry.”236 But today (and for the last few decades), union density
is considerably lower than it was when Congress adopted § 8(b)(4), and in any
event, “[n]o worker can lawfully be prevented from working for crossing a picket
line or refusing to serve picket duty.”237 Instead, today’s union picket lines
depend far more on the moral persuasiveness of their messages about labor
standards, fair treatment, and respect at work.
In fact, the secondary boycott ban’s legislative history suggests that the
measure was inspired by incidents that have little in common with stationary
rat balloons, mock funerals that respect jaywalking laws, or much other
activity that today risks secondary boycott liability. For example, one member
of Congress who supported Taft-Hartley in 1947 cited a secondary strike that
culminated with “20,000 gallons of ‘hot milk’ . . . dumped one morning in
front of the city hall of Los Angeles.”238 Congressman Fred Hartley, after
whom Taft-Hartley was named, emphasized that the Act’s secondary boycott
provisions would reach secondary boycotts that led either to very small
businesses shutting down, or to violent mass picketing that resulted in “heads
[being] bashed in, bones broken, and all that sort of thing . . . .”239 And the
1959 amendments to § 8(b)(4) reﬂect that Congress’s main concerns were
with “shakedown” or “blackmail” picketing, and with the inﬂuence of corrupt
leadership within some unions.240
Today’s secondary boycotts are diﬀerent in substance as well as form.
Rather than targeting (and potentially putting out of business) very small
employers, today’s unions often want to use secondary pressure to respond to
workplace “ﬁssuring,”241 as Preferred Building Services reﬂects. Fissuring refers
to a list of business practices that devolve responsibility for complying with
labor and employment law obligations from bigger to smaller ﬁrms, such as
when large and ﬁnancially well-oﬀ enterprises subcontract their cleaning

236 Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2081 (2018).
237 Id.
238 93 CONG. REC. A1295 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1947) (extension of remarks of Rep. Landis),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 583 (1959).
239 93 CONG. REC. H3534 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1947) (statement of Rep. Hartley), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 614 (1959).
240 E.g., S. REP. NO. 86-187, at 78 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2422 (discussing
the use of secondary boycotts by the Teamsters Union under the leadership of Jimmy Hoffa).
241 See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).

2020]

Avoidance Creep

377

needs to much smaller businesses.242 These smaller businesses are often
poorly capitalized, and they can be wholly dependent on a handful of large
clients to stay operational. In this scenario, the large clients—secondary
employers in labor law terms—eﬀectively hold all the cards.243
Larger companies are also often more vulnerable to the social pressure that
comes with picketing than the small employers they contract with. In these
circumstances, collective action aimed at the small employer is likely to be
fruitless; even if that employer is aware of and inclined to comply with labor
and employment law, it will often be powerless to give employees what they
want, as it is also being squeezed by its clients. In other words, pressuring a
nominally secondary employer can be a union’s best chance of winning better
treatment for a group of employees who have had their workplace fissured.
In addition to the modern-day realities of the ﬁssured workplace, it is
worth considering the types of tactics that could violate § 8(b)(4). Whereas
Congressman Hartley was apparently worried about bashed heads and broken
bones, the NLRB and the courts today focus on questions such as whether
union handbilling can violate the provision of § 8(b)(4) that covers inducing
or encouraging secondary strikes,244 and whether signs locked away in parked
cars can qualify as picketing.245 It is hard to see these questions as reﬂecting
anything but a break between the law of secondary activity and reality: as the
comedian Mitch Hedberg observed, “when someone tries to hand me out a
ﬂier, it’s kind of like they’re saying ‘here, you throw this away.’”246
A related consequence of the Board’s approach to § 8(b)(4) is that it tends
to center lawyers who understand the vagaries of the law of secondary
boycotts, and who might intervene in workers’ protests, sapping their
momentum. For example, in Preferred Building Services, Inc., whether or not
the OJS employees were entitled to the “Moore Dry Dock” presumption
apparently turned on their use of the pronoun “their”; perhaps if they had
242 Id. at 189-90. Fissuring also includes other business arrangements such as supply-chain
management and franchising. NLRA limits on secondary activity can also aﬀect employees’ abilities
to respond to working conditions that arise in these arrangements.
243 Sometimes these enterprises will qualify as “joint employers” of the employees; when that
is the case, strikes or pickets of the larger employer would qualify as primary activity. See BrowningFerris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 1600 (2015) (discussing the scope of joint
employment liability). But where the larger enterprise is a contractor or client rather than a joint
employer, unions risk § 8(b)(4) liability.
244 E.g., Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 356 N.L.R.B. 613, 614 (2011) (addressing the
question of whether displaying banners seeking to shame secondary employers constituted a
violation of § 8(b)(4)).
245 Verizon New England Inc. v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 480, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing
whether signs locked in parked cars violated the “no picketing” term in the operative collective
bargaining agreement).
246 Mitch Hedberg, Here, You Throw This Away, YOUTUBE, (Aug. 6, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4PNZSgVVgJo [https://perma.cc/QE4L-M2XM].
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requested that the building tenant take steps to ensure that “Preferred’s”
janitors received higher wages, the Board would have found the presumption
applied.247 But this kind of post-hoc ﬂyspecking by the NLRB chills workers’
and unions’ collective action by making it very diﬃcult for them to predict
what activities the NLRB will ultimately deem to violate § 8(b)(4).
This subsection’s focus has been on the consequences of avoidance for
labor law; the next subsection turns to how constitutional avoidance in labor
law may have aﬀected the development of constitutional law.
B. Constitutional Avoidance’s Eﬀects on Constitutional Law
The Court’s reliance on constitutional avoidance in labor law cases has
also had consequences for First Amendment law. This is because statutory
decisions based on constitutional avoidance are generally not in conversation
with constitutional decisions, so developments in one context often do not
translate into the other. This subsection explores some of those consequences;
it focuses mainly on union secondary activity, although it would be possible
to construct a similar story regarding union dues and fees.
A result of the Court’s use of avoidance is that its § 8(b)(4) decisions tend
to sit like rocks in the stream of developing First Amendment law. Of course,
there are no guarantees that unions would have won if the Court had decided
cases like Tree Fruits or Safeco or Street on constitutional grounds instead of
avoidance grounds—but win or lose, constitutional decisions are routinely
placed in juxtaposition with other constitutional decisions by lawyers and
judges, making it less likely that labor law’s trajectory would have evolved so
diﬀerently from other First Amendment contexts.
Many scholars, myself included, have argued that labor law’s ban on
secondary activity is ﬂatly inconsistent with modern First Amendment
doctrine, despite the Court’s decisions in Tree Fruits and DeBartolo.248
Without reprising that argument here, the inconsistency between § 8(b)(4)
and the First Amendment is readily apparent in light of a series of recent
(non-labor law) decisions holding that picketing and other methods of
communication enjoy robust First Amendment protection.249 In Snyder v.
Phelps, eight justices agreed that the Westboro Baptist Church’s highly
oﬀensive picketing at a soldier’s funeral was pure speech at the very heart of
366 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (2018); see also supra note 220.
See generally supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 537 U.S. 464, 496-97 (2014) (holding that a Massachusetts
statute that criminalized standing on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance to a
facility where abortions were performed was unconstitutional because it burdened more speech than
necessary); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (holding that picketing at the funeral of a
soldier cannot be subject to tort liability because of the First Amendment).
247
248
249
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the First Amendment, writing that “picketing peacefully on matters of public
concern . . . occupies a ‘special position in terms of First Amendment
protection.’”250 And in Virginia v. Black, the Court wrote that even crossburning could qualify as “core political speech,” although it also allowed that
states could criminalize cross burning with an intent to intimidate.251
Later, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court emphasized that the
government’s authority to regulate protests in traditional public fora,
including sidewalks, was “very limited,” and that laws that regulated protest
based on its content or viewpoint should be subject to strict scrutiny.252 And
in recent cases, the Court has emphasized that discrimination based on a
speaker’s viewpoint, the content of a speaker’s message, or a speaker’s own
identity all presumptively violate the First Amendment.253 Section 8(b)(4)
violates all these proscriptions,254 and should therefore be held constitutional
only if it can satisfy strict scrutiny—a test that a prohibition that applies to
peaceful sidewalk picketing should not be able to meet.
Snyder and other more recent First Amendment cases generally do not cite
recent labor picketing cases either in the decisions or in briefing—a fact that is
unsurprising when one considers that the § 8(b)(4) cases in which the union
wins are statutory cases premised on avoidance, and the § 8(b)(4) cases in which
the union loses are in likely irreconcilable tension with more recent First
Amendment cases. For example, neither the opinion in Phelps nor the opinion
in McCullen cites any modern case about labor protest.255 And I am aware of
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 456 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)).
538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.).
573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014).
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995)) (stating that speaker and viewpoint discrimination is
“presumptively unconstitutional”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“[c]ontent
based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justiﬁed only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests”); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (“In the
ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content based and, in practice,
viewpoint discriminatory.”).
254 James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, The Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Organize
in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941, 950-51 (1999). Pope explains § 8(b)(4)’s
viewpoint, content, and speaker discrimination with a hypothetical involving three people holding
picket signs outside a store: the ﬁrst two signs bear nearly identical messages, asking customers to
boycott the store because it sells a toy produced by non-union labor in exploitative working
conditions—but one sign is held by a union organizer, and the other by a human rights activist. The
third sign, carried by a store employee, urges customers to buy the toy by advertising its low price—
a price that is likely possible because of the exploitative working conditions. In this situation, only
the unionist risks liability under § 8(b)(4); the human rights activist has engaged in core First
Amendment activity similar to that in Claiborne Hardware, and the store employee’s sign is protected
under the Court’s commercial speech doctrine.
255 The opinion in McCullen quotes Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37 (1983), regarding the public forum doctrine. Perry concerns whether a union that does not
250
251
252
253
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only one brief in either of those cases that cites labor picketing cases: the AFLCIO’s amicus brief in McCullen cites both DeBartolo and Tree Fruits—ironically,
as an example of the “Court’s leading First Amendment decisions involv[ing]
the efforts of union members to engage in . . . expressive activities.”256
One result has been the development of what I have previously called the
“First Amendment of labor law,”257 and Professor James Gray Pope has called the
“black hole” of labor speech,258 in which the following related principles hold:
•
•
•
•

Picketing can be more strictly regulated than other types of
expression, so whether a style of expression qualiﬁes as “picketing”
is a critical question in litigation.259
Speech can be regulated when it is “coercive,” but the definition of
“coercion” can include potential listener discomfort, potential marketplace
losses, or the mere fact that the speech conveyed was via picket.260
A public message that contains relatively little detail may be
regulated more robustly than one that contains a lot of detail.261
A misleading (but technically accurate) public message can be
regulated more robustly than a more evenhanded one.262

Of course, it is within the Court’s power, in an appropriate case, to align
the First Amendment of labor law more closely with the First Amendment
as it exists elsewhere. Perhaps one reason the Court has not done this is that
so many § 8(b)(4) cases are statutory cases that appear to turn on the vagaries
of the location of an inﬂatable rat, or whether wearing a sandwich board or
represent teachers may nonetheless distribute literature in their school mailboxes. McCullen, 473
U.S. at 476 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009)). The public forum
doctrine traces back to a foundational First Amendment case. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
256 Brief of the Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs in Support of Petitioners at 1,
n.2, McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (No. 12-1168).
257 Charlotte Garden, Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law, 43 STETSON L.
REV. 571, 573 (2014); see also Garden, supra note 114.
258 See Pope, supra note 114.
259 Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (noting that “time, place or manner”
restrictions can be placed on picketing).
260 Cf. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200-01 (2010) (holding that plaintiﬀs seeking to avoid forced
disclosure of their signatures under the First Amendment must show speciﬁc danger of “threats,
harassment, or reprisals”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 932-33 (1982) (tort
liability arising from consumer boycott enforced by “watchers” and accompanied by a handful of
violent incidents was inconsistent with First Amendment).
261 Cf. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454 (placards with messages such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”
“plainly relate[] to broad issues of interest to society at large”).
262 Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (observing that there is no “general
exception to the First Amendment for false statements” because “some false statements are inevitable
if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation”).
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dressing in a rat costume is like “picketing.” These fact-bound issues would
likely not meet the criteria for certiorari, especially if the Court believes the
outcome in these cases was correct. Litigation strategies could also play a role,
as union litigants will reasonably argue that their cases ﬁt within the bounds
of DeBartolo and Tree Fruits if such an argument is available. (Of course,
unions may then make alternative arguments—such as that § 8(b)(4) should
be construed not to cover that conduct in order to avoid constitutional
questions.263) And if the NLRB decides a case on statutory grounds,
reviewing circuit courts will often also avoid the constitutional issue by
aﬃrming on statutory grounds. These dynamics not only entrench DeBartolo,
Safeco, and Tree Fruits, but also facilitate their creep, as litigants attempt to
stretch them to reach new situations.
But is it likely that First Amendment law would be diﬀerent if it included
more cases involving union picketing and other secondary activity? The
intuitive answer is yes: Adding these cases to the mix of First Amendment
law could have shifted the path of developing First Amendment law. Research
supports this intuition, as scholars have used a variety of methods that show
context matters to the development of law.264 So, although counterfactuals
have obvious limitations, it is worth brieﬂy considering how things might
have played out if the Court had answered the First Amendment questions
in cases like Tree Fruits or DeBartolo instead of avoiding them.
One possibility is that the Court would have reached the same outcome
in those two cases, but for constitutional rather than statutory reasons. These
decisions could have been broad, striking down § 8(b)(4) altogether, or (more
likely) narrow, holding that the statute could not constitutionally be applied
to the union conduct at issue in the cases. Such decisions certainly would have
been signiﬁcant for unions and for labor law; among other reasons, they
would not be subject to the avoidance creep described above, so that Safeco
might not have followed Tree Fruits. But their signiﬁcance for constitutional
law may have been more muted, given that such decisions likely would have
been broadly consistent with a raft of other pro-speech, pro-protest First
Amendment cases discussed earlier in this Part.
The more interesting possibility is the opposite one: perhaps the Court
would have decided that the NLRA’s prohibitions on struck-product
263 See, e.g., Charging Party Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 87’s Motion for Reconsideration,
Preferred Building Services, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (No. 20-CA-149353).
264 Leong, supra note 32, at 462 (arguing that “[w]hen rights-making occurs in a single context,
the characteristics of that context begin to distort the law”); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 918 (2006) (arguing with respect to common-law decisionmaking that
“when we combine the lessons of at least one strand of Legal Realism with some of the lessons of
modern social science, we see as well that real events, real parties, real controversies, and real
consequences may have distorting eﬀects as well as illuminating ones”).
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picketing and consumer handbilling were consistent with the First
Amendment. The Court’s rationale in such a case would then have inﬂuenced
the development of future First Amendment cases, perhaps moderating the
Court’s emerging deregulatory First Amendment doctrine.265 It is beyond the
scope of this article to construct an alternate-universe First Amendment, but
one can imagine that cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health,266 in which the Court
struck down a Vermont law prohibiting the use of certain information about
doctors’ prescribing practices in pharmaceutical advertising, might have come
out diﬀerently. In Sorrell, the Court wrote that Vermont’s law could not
survive strict scrutiny in part because the state could not prove that
advertising harmed patient outcomes: “[t]hat the State ﬁnds expression too
persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its
messengers.”267 But § 8(b)(4) also rests on unproven predictions about how
businesses and consumers might react to labor protest, and it also reﬂects a
legislative desire to shape the marketplace. Thus, whereas I argued above that
§ 8(b)(4) should be struck down in light of Sorrell and related cases, one can
also imagine a world in which Vermont’s law was upheld, with the Court
majority applying Safeco in support of its reasoning.
Whereas this Part has focused on the development of law in the courts
and before the NLRB, the next section turns back to Congress, asking
what the examples I have discussed so far mean for accounts of legislative
intent and avoidance.
C. Congressional Intent, Constitutional Avoidance, and Labor Law
As discussed in Part I, avoidance critics and defenders alike agree that the
traditional account of avoidance—that Congress generally aims to avoid
drafting statutes that raise constitutional questions—is of doubtful empirical
validity. Instead, avoidance defenders oﬀer alternative reasons to use the
canon, such as Scalia and Garner’s admonition that avoidance reﬂects a
“judicial policy” that statutes “ought not . . . tread on questionable
constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly . . . .”268 This Part discusses
the extent to which the traditional or alternative accounts of avoidance ﬁt well
with the labor law examples discussed above. It concludes that they do not,
and that avoidance creep worsens the ﬁt problems.
265 John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 248-51 (2015) (describing an empirical analysis ﬁnding that the First
Amendment is increasingly used by businesses for deregulatory purposes); Amanda Shanor, The
New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (arguing that the “First Amendment has emerged as a
powerful deregulatory engine”).
266 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
267 Id. at 578.
268 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 249.
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1. In General
Avoidance defenders generally agree that the traditional account does not
reﬂect reality,269 but it is possible that the NLRA’s prohibition on secondary
activity is an exception. That is, in enacting and amending § 8(b)(4),
Congress may have wanted the Court to interpret the statute narrowly to
avoid encroaching on unions’ First Amendment rights. After all, the Drivers
Court suggested that Congress actually baked this preference into the
statutory language by including in the Act § 13’s limiting provision. (That
provision states that “[n]othing in this subchapter, except as speciﬁcally
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to aﬀect the limitations or
qualiﬁcations on that right.”270) And in fact, that reasoning was convincing in
Drivers, because the Court was interpreting a provision of the NLRA that did
not “speciﬁcally” discuss strikes or picketing at all.271 That is, the Court was
right not to read the Act’s general prohibition on union interference with
employees’ right to not engage in collective action as encompassing
Congress’s later enactment of a speciﬁc provision forbidding recognitional
picketing. But that argument does not translate neatly to the § 8(b)(4)
context, which does speciﬁcally address secondary activity, making it hard to
see how § 13 calls for the court to read § 8(b)(4) narrowly—an issue that the
Tree Fruits Court ignored altogether when it incorporated the Drivers
approach.272 Thus, the idea that the NLRA itself directs courts (and the
Board) to interpret § 8(b)(4) narrowly seems to be a stretch at best.
See supra Part I.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (2018); see also NLRB v. Drivers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274,
281 n.9 (1960).
271 Drivers, 362 U.S. at 281-84.
272 The legislative history of § 13 is scant, but it does not bolster the idea that § 13 reﬂects
congressional concern that courts might read § 8(b)(4) too broadly. The House version of what
ultimately became § 13 read as follows:
269
270

Except as speciﬁcally provided in this section, nothing in this Act shall be construed
to diminish the right of employees to strike or to engage in other lawful concerted
activities. No provision of this Act, and no order of any court issued hereunder, shall
be construed to require any individual to perform labor or service without his consent.
H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 62 (1947).
The House committee report does not explain this provision, but it appears to be aimed, in
part, at limiting the remedies available to neutral employers of striking employees. In contrast, the
Senate version included the limiting language that was included in the ﬁnal bill (specifying that
Taft-Hartley did not aﬀect “limitations or qualiﬁcations” on the right to strike), with the Senate
report clarifying that § 13 was intended to “diminish[] the right to strike only to the extent
speciﬁcally provided” but also to ensure that courts did not view Taft-Hartley as overriding a number
of Board and Court precedents that limited employees’ right to strike, including by permitting
employers to permanently replace strikers. S. REP. NO. 105, at 28 (1947). The House Conference
Report reﬂects that the conference included the Senate version of this provision in the ﬁnal bill
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This leaves only the alternative accounts oﬀered by scholars to justify the
use of avoidance in as-applied cases, such as that avoidance protects underenforced constitutional norms, or preserves judicial legitimacy in charged
cases.273 These beneﬁts are real in some types of cases—but context matters,
and these rationales are not convincing in the labor-picketing context. For
example, Ernest Young writes that “resistance norms” are appropriate in cases
that “are plagued by line-drawing problems” and that arise in “ﬁelds in which
we can expect political safeguards to play the primary role in protecting the
underlying constitutional values.”274 It goes nearly without saying that First
Amendment issues—including both union picketing and agency fees—will
fall squarely outside these guidelines. And, in contrast to Cold War-era cases
concerning members of the Communist Party that captured Philip Frickey’s
interest,275 there is no reason to believe that the Court would have faced a
legitimacy crisis if it had held that § 8(b)(4) was unconstitutional.276
Conversely, there are at least two additional reasons that militate against
the Court’s use of constitutional avoidance in these cases. The first is that the
use of constitutional avoidance—and especially the use of aggressive forms of
avoidance, where the Court applies a clear statement rule or resolves an
insubstantial constitutional question—can appear strategic or results-oriented.
Scholars, including Richard Hasen, have criticized the Court’s selective use or
nonuse of avoidance in other cases on precisely this ground.277 This Article’s
account of avoidance creep highlights this risk: even a principled use of
avoidance could be indirectly subject to this criticism if it is used by later courts
in unexpected or illegitimate ways. For example, a reader inclined towards
cynicism might observe that although avoidance creep in the dues/fees context
looks different than avoidance creep in the union picketing context, they do
have one thing in common: both versions ultimately work to unions’

because it “recognize[d] that the right to strike is not an unlimited and unqualiﬁed right.” H.R. REP.
NO. 510, at 59 (1947) (Conf. Rep.).
273 See supra Part I.
274 Young, supra note 3, at 1603.
275 See generally Frickey, supra note 3 (discussing how the Warren Court used constitutional
avoidance in an era of political unrest about Communism).
276 The labor case most closely associated with a judicial legitimacy crisis is surely NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). There, the Court at least purported to use
constitutional avoidance, but still broke with precedent to hold that the National Labor Relations
Act was within Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Id. at 30, see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text. This decision is sometimes referred to as the “switch in time.” See Bruce
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 458 (1989) (describing the
“switch in time”); Mark Tushnet, The New Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law, Politics, or What?, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1063-64 (1999) (reviewing BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT (1998)) (discussing criticism of the “switch in time” account).
277 Hasen, supra note 19; see also Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 12.
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disadvantage. Perhaps this is because “judges don’t like labor unions.”278 But
even if that isn’t the reason, courts risk at least the appearance of partiality.
Second, the Court’s use of constitutional avoidance in First Amendment
cases involving labor is a poor ﬁt with other important and longstanding
constitutional values. This is true of both picketing cases and dues/fees cases,
but for somewhat diﬀerent reasons.
First, as Lisa Kloppenberg has observed, “when it employs the avoidance
canon, the Court sidesteps its ‘lawsaying’ responsibility that requires it to
directly address constitutional rights and values.”279 In other words, and as
the Court’s picketing cases amply illustrate, constitutional avoidance
unnecessarily leaves parties in the dark about the scope of their First
Amendment rights. But contrast that approach to the Court’s usual approach
in First Amendment cases, which demands “breathing space” for speakers,280
a concept that is operationalized by doctrines like vagueness and
overbreadth.281 Do cases like Tree Fruits and Safeco contain the same breathing
space? Perhaps: if the Court ultimately would have concluded that there is no
First Amendment right to picket a struck product, then Tree Fruits gives
speakers extra protection to which they are not “entitled” under the First
Amendment. But that outcome seems very unlikely in light of the Court’s
other recent First Amendment cases. If, instead, the union would have won
under the First Amendment, then Tree Fruits and Safeco cut very narrowly.
For example, they allow would-be speakers’ rights to turn on factual
information to which they may not have access: the percentage of the neutral
enterprise’s business derived from sales of the struck product. Thus, instead
of leaving ample breathing space for union speakers, § 8(b)(4) cases cut
narrowly, leaving would-be speakers unsure about whether their speech will
run afoul of that statute. Similarly, in Eliason & Knuth, the Board majority
approvingly cited a Ninth Circuit case suggesting that consumer-facing
secondary activity was coercive only when it involved the creation of “‘a
symbolic barrier’ through patrolling or other conduct” near a building’s
entrance, the “taunting of passersby,” or “the massing of a large group of
278 See generally George Schatzki, It’s Simple: Judges Don’t Like Labor Unions, 30 C ONN. L.
REV. 1365 (1998).
279 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court’s Construction
of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (1996).
280 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 750 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (writing
that although “false statements of fact do not merit First Amendment protection for their own
sake . . . it is sometimes necessary to exten[d] a measure of strategic protection to these statements
in order to ensure suﬃcient breathing space for protected speech”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive . . . .”).
281 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613-14 (1971) (striking down an ordinance
for being “unconstitutionally vague” and “unconstitutionally broad”).
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people.”282 Even if one thinks it is clear ex ante what qualiﬁes as “taunting”
or “massing,” reasonable people could at minimum diﬀer on what constitutes
a “symbolic” barrier, particularly as distinguished from speech that persuades
customers to take their business elsewhere.
Second, the labor context involves multiple First Amendment interests
that are in tension with each other. Workers who object to their union’s
political positions have an interest in not funding those positions (though
perhaps that interest should not be actionable under the First Amendment),
but unions and union members have their own interests in engaging in
political speech without having to first fund objectors’ bargaining costs.283 This
fact differentiates the dues/fees context from contexts such as criminal or
immigration law, in which avoidance functions essentially as a version of the
rule of lenity, protecting individuals from certain government-inflicted
consequences.284 The difference is that in the immigration or criminal law
context, avoidance works in one predictable direction and in a way that is
consistent with other constitutional values. But an avoidance decision that
over-protects the speech or association interests of one group of workers in the
dues/fees context necessarily works to the detriment of other workers with
their own speech or association interests. Then, avoidance creep risks
exacerbating imbalances that result from the original application of avoidance.
2. In As-Applied Challenges
The cases discussed in this Article include both facial and as-applied
challenges, and the Court has not distinguished between those two contexts in
its use of avoidance. But, as I have previously argued, there is a significant
difference. That is, whereas it is at least theoretically possible that Congress
might have preferred the court to use constitutional avoidance to avoid the risk
of constitutional invalidation of the statute, it is illogical to suggest that Congress
might prefer a narrow construction of a statute “when the only possible effect is
to increase the chance that the as-applied challenge will succeed.”285
Other critiques of the traditional judicial account of constitutional
avoidance have missed that courts apply avoidance in both facial and asapplied challenges, and that this fact has implications for the premise that
Congress is risk-averse about the possibility of judicial invalidation. Even
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 810 (2010).
See Garden, supra note 114, at 40-41.
See Posner, supra note 13, at 816 (discussing the relationship between constitutional
avoidance and the rule of lenity); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (holding, as
matter of constitutional avoidance, that an immigration statute “limits an alien’s post-removalperiod detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United
States.”).
285 Garden, supra note 14, at 133.
282
283
284
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assuming the traditional judicial account accurately reﬂects congressional
preferences, that preference is not implicated by as-applied challenges. That
is because the stated alternative to constitutional avoidance—the risk that the
court will strike down the statute altogether—is absent when a plaintiﬀ
challenges only the application of a statute to him or herself. Instead, the only
eﬀect of avoidance in as-applied cases is to make it more likely that the
challenger will win. And indeed, the key avoidance decisions in the labor
picketing context—Drivers, DeBartolo, and Tree Fruits—all involved asapplied challenges.286 Thus, in those cases, the traditional account of
avoidance is especially inapt. Instead, a rational legislator would plainly prefer
the Court to give § 8(b)(4) its most natural reading, and then decide whether
or not that reading comports with the Constitution.
CONCLUSION: AVOIDING AVOIDANCE CREEP
This Article has argued that avoidance creep renders constitutional
avoidance both less benign and less useful than advertised. Still, it is unlikely
that either the NLRB or the Courts will abandon it in the near future. But
courts could and should take steps to minimize the risks of avoidance creep.
I oﬀer here a few suggestions, which I plan to develop at length in future
work. First, courts should both state clearly which constitutional questions
they are avoiding, and give a careful explanation of why the Court believes
the case raises those questions. Relatedly, courts should articulate a reasonable
basis for reading a statute in a way they believe avoids a constitutional
question, eschewing reliance on clear statement rules. Second, given the
realistic possibility that future courts may, perversely, view an avoidance
decision as aﬃrming the underlying statute’s constitutionality or
unconstitutionality, courts applying avoidance could more forcefully declare
that they do not intend readers to draw such an inference. Third, courts
considering whether to use the avoidance canon in reviewing an agency
decision should more explicitly weigh the costs and beneﬁts of overriding
agency deference. Finally, and more ambitiously, courts could revisit the
rationale for avoidance. But, at a minimum, they should use avoidance only
if its implementation would be at least minimally consistent with the
doctrine’s stated rationale—a low standard that courts nonetheless currently
fail to meet when they use avoidance to resolve as-applied challenges.
286 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 578 (1988) (stating that § 8(b)(4) is “open to a construction that obviates deciding whether
a congressional prohibition of handbilling on the facts of this case would violate the First
Amendment”) (emphasis added); NLRB v. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964) (“We disagree
therefore with the Court of Appeals that the test of ‘to threaten, coerce, or restrain’ for the purposes
of this case is whether Safeway suﬀered or was likely to suﬀer economic loss.”) (emphasis in original);.

388

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 331

Although constitutional avoidance is an established component of our
interpretive canon, we need not accept its eﬀects as a given. Exposing
avoidance creep is the ﬁrst step in confronting avoidance’s problematic role
in the development of labor law and beyond. By untangling the principle of
avoidance from its later inﬂuence over substantive law, we can begin to both
identify and avoid avoidance creep.

